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Individual savings accounts are a recurring reform option for unemployment insurance. Under a
system of individual accounts individuals are forced to save part of their income into an
individual account out of which beneﬁts are paid during unemployment. Individuals are allowed
to have a negative balance and still have the same access to income during unemployment.
When negative balances at the end of working life are nulliﬁed some risk pooling remains. To
study the impact of introducing individual accounts for unemployment we construct a simulation
model, which we calibrate for the Netherlands. The simulation results suggest that an optimal
combination of forced savings/borrowing and insurance can slightly increase welfare, when
unemployed are credit constrained. When credit constraints are not that important for the
unemployment risk, individual accounts are less interesting for unemployment, but then current
UI replacement rates seem rather generous. Empirical studies suggest that the role of credit
constraints in unemployment is limited.
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Abstract in Dutch
Een regelmatig terugkerende hervormingsoptie voor de werkloosheidsverzekering is de
introductie van een zogenoemde spaar-WW. In plaats van een premie te betalen moeten
werknemers dan verplicht sparen op een individuele rekening waaruit de uitkering tijdens
werkloosheid wordt betaald. Omdat werknemers ook ’rood’ kunnen staan, blijven zij verzekerd
van voldoende inkomen tijdens werkloosheid. Verder blijft een zekere mate van risicodeling
bestaan wanneer negatieve saldi aan het eind van het werkzame leven worden kwijtgescholden.
Om een inschatting te maken van de effecten van een spaar-WW voor Nederland construeren we
een simulatiemodel. De simulaties geven aan dat een optimale combinatie van spaarvoet en
uitkeringsvoet de welvaart licht kan verhogen, mits werklozen tegen leenbeperkingen aanlopen.
Wanneer werklozen niet tegen leenbeperkingen aanlopen, dan is een spaar-WW minder
interessant, maar in dat geval lijkt de huidige WW-uitkering vrij genereus. Het schaarse
empirisch onderzoek daarnaar suggereert dat het belang van leenbeperkingen beperkt is.
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6Preface
It has become increasingly popular to study labour market risk and labour market policy from a
lifecycle perspective. So-called unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA) have come
up as an interesting alternative to the current system of premium ﬁnanced unemployment
insurance. UISA allow the policy maker to distinguish between the need for liquidity and the
need for insurance in unemployment, potentially improving welfare. This document covers the
relevant literature and studies the impact of UI and UISA in a lifecycle model with
unemployment risk. The model is calibrated to Dutch data and pays special attention to the role
of liquidity constraints.
This document has beneﬁted from comments and suggestions by Hans Bloemen, Frank den
Butter, Joachim Inkmann, Hamish Low, seminar participants at Netspar and CPB, and
colleagues from CPB and various ministries, in particular Annemiek van Vuren with whom the
author has also written a paper on UISA in Dutch (Jongen and Van Vuren, 2008). The author
also thanks Harry ter Rele for data on wage proﬁles, Robert Holzmann and Milan Vodopivec for
material from their forthcoming volume Improving severance pay: An international perspective




What are individual savings accounts for unemployment?
Under the current unemployment insurance system employees pay a premium to ﬁnance
unemployment insurance for the unemployed. Under a system of individual savings accounts for
unemployment (UISA) the premium is replaced by mandatory savings into an individual account
out of which beneﬁts are paid during unemployment. Because individuals can have a negative
balance they still have access to income during unemployment. Furthermore, in a popular
proposal, negative terminal balances at the end of working life are nulliﬁed, which is ﬁnanced by
a tax, and positive terminal balances go to the individual pension account.
UISA improve incentives ...
Individuals that expect to end up with a positive terminal balance will have a stronger incentive
to keep their job and to ﬁnd a new one in case of job loss. Individuals that expect to end up with
a negative terminal balance will have weaker incentives. As most individuals will end up with a
positive terminal balance, on net incentives are improved and unemployment will fall.
... but reduce insurance
But the pooling of the unemployment risk will fall as well. Individuals that are unemployed
often or for a long duration will have a lower lifetime income. However, some risk pooling
remains when negative terminal balances are nulliﬁed.
UISA can improve the trade-off between incentives and insurance in the case of borrowing
constraints ...
Hence, also UISA do not escape the trade-off between incentives and insurance. However, they
may improve this trade-off. When unemployed have no assets and can not borrow then their
consumption is determined solely by their unemployment beneﬁts. UISA force individuals to
build up some precautionary savings for job loss and allow the unemployed to borrow in the case
of job loss. In this way, individuals can ’self-insure’ against the risk of unemployment and the
need for public insurance against unemployment is reduced. This improves the incentives of the
unemployed. However, UISA only have an advantage over a standard UI system when
individuals can not implement the self-insurance themselves. When unemployed individuals do
not run into borrowing constraints this advantage of UISA over the UI system disappears.
.... but the role of borrowing constraints in unemployment seems limited
Most unemployed individuals do not run into liquidity constraints during unemployment. Most
unemployment spells do not last that long, and most unemployed have sufﬁcient assets or access
to funds to cover the larger part of the income shock due to unemployment. Indeed, studies that
9look into the effect of a change in the unemployment beneﬁt on the consumption of the
unemployed ﬁnd that consumption falls only slightly even when beneﬁts are reduced
substantially.
Simulation results indicate that the welfare gains of UISA in the Netherlands are small
We study the effects of introducing UISA in a lifecycle model with unemployment risk,
calibrated on Dutch data. The introduction of UISA leads to a substantial drop in
unemployment, but also to a substantial loss in risk pooling. Starting from an optimal
unemployment beneﬁt level the overall welfare gains are small (< .1% in consumption terms).
Also in the model, most unemployed do not run into borrowing constraints. Starting from a
higher beneﬁt level, the welfare gains from introducing UISA are larger, but then simply
reducing beneﬁt levels seems a more direct alternative.
Lessons for unemployment insurance
The model also illustrates the determinants of the optimal beneﬁt level of unemployment
insurance. The optimal beneﬁt level is higher when workers are more risk averse or when the use
of unemployment beneﬁts is less responsive to the level of beneﬁts. The novelty is that the
optimal beneﬁt level also depends on the extent to which workers can ’self-insure’ via
precautionary savings and borrowing. The optimal beneﬁt level is signiﬁcantly higher when
individuals are constrained in their ability to save and borrow for the unemployment risk than
when they are not.
101 Introduction
During their working life, many employees run a non negligible and persistent income risk due
to unemployment. The main policies that target this risk are unemployment insurance (UI),
active labour market policies and (ALMPs) employment protection legislation (EPL). In this
paper we focus on the system of UI.1 In particular, we consider how so-called unemployment
insurance savings accounts (UISA) affect the workings of the labour market and welfare. Under
a system of UISA individuals are forced to save part of their income into an individual account
out of which beneﬁts are paid during unemployment. Individuals are allowed to have a negative
balance which gives ’liquidity insurance’ for periods of unemployment. Furthermore by
nullifying negative balances at the end of the working life, as suggested by Feldstein and Altman
(1998), some risk pooling and redistribution, ’lifetime income insurance’, remains.
Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004) and Stiglitz and Yun (2005) have shown that a UISA system
can raise welfare in theory. We will consider the main mechanisms in these papers and some
potential caveats below. The focus of this paper is on the quantitative impact of individual
accounts on the labour market and welfare. Unfortunately we have no empirical knowledge on
the impact of individual accounts for unemployment, apart from some descriptive statistics on
the recent reform in Chili. To study the impact of individual accounts we therefore develop and
calibrate a lifecycle model with unemployment risk to simulate the impact of individual
accounts. In the model individuals decide on consumption, savings and search effort, where
individuals may be constrained in their choices by credit constraints. The latter plays a crucial
role in the impact of individual accounts. We calibrate the model on the panel data from De
Koning et al. (2006) on the incidence and duration of unemployment in the Netherlands, and the
international literature on the extent of moral hazard and the insurance gains from
unemployment insurance.
This is not the ﬁrst paper on UISA in the Netherlands, see e.g. Kock and Den Butter (2001),
Rezwani and Hendrix (2002), Van Kuringen (2005), De Koning et al. (2006) and Rezwani
(2006). However, these papers still leave many questions unanswered. The analysis in Kock and
Den Butter (2001) gives an interesting discussion of pros and cons but given their informal
analysis the net effects remain unclear. Rezwani and Hendrix (2002), Van Kuringen (2005), De
Koning et al. (2006) and Rezwani (2006) give interesting data on resulting account surpluses
and deﬁcits given current transitions between unemployment and employment, but do not
consider the impact of a UISA system on behaviour and welfare. In this paper we try to go
beyond the previous analyses to answer the question whether individual accounts can improve
welfare and how much if anything can be gained.
1 For an analysis of ALMPs in the Netherlands see e.g. Jongen et al. (2003), and for an analysis of EPL in the
Netherlands see e.g. Deelen et al. (2006) and Jongen and Visser (2009).
11The analysis also tries to go beyond previous simulation analyses of a UISA system for other
countries. Brown et al. (2006) calibrate a model for a number of large European countries where
individuals are either 0, 50 or 100 percent unemployed over their working life, which leads to an
unrealistic distribution of unemployment over individual lifecycles. Furthermore, they ignore
credit constraints and do not compare a UISA with an optimised UI system, which raises some
questions on the welfare gains they ﬁnd. Hopenhayn and Hatchondo (2002) consider UISA in an
extension of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) to multiple unemployment spells, and calibrate the
model to Estonian data. Unfortunately, they do not give the optimisation problem and ﬁrst order
conditions for the adapted model with the UISA system, and the discussion of the simulation
outcomes is an overview of numerical results without discussing the mechanisms driving the
results. Hopefully this will be overcome when the paper is published. Until then, in this paper
we try to be clear on the mechanisms driving our results, and we go beyond the analysis of
Hopenhayn and Hatchondo (2002) by allowing the search technology to differ between age and
education groups and we calibrate the model on Dutch rather than Estonian data.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we ﬁrst consider the bare bones of a
system of individual accounts, illustrate how it works using some hypothetical lifecycles and
review some empirical ’bookkeeping’ exercises on how UISA affect the distribution of lifetime
incomes for different countries. Section 3 then considers how a UISA can improve welfare in
theory. In Section 4 we review the empirical ﬁndings on the moral hazard and insurance gains of
UI, and the role of credit constraints. We use these ﬁndings, and the incidence and duration data
of De Koning et al. (2006) to calibrate a lifecycle model with unemployment risk, in Section 5.
Section 6 gives the simulation results for UI and UISA. Section 7 then discusses some
limitations of the analysis and how these might affect the results. Section 8 concludes.
122 UISA: deﬁnition and accounting
In this section we consider what is meant by a UISA system, how such a system affects lifetime
income with the help of some hypothetical lifecycles, and review some ’real life’ accounting
exercises on the impact of a UISA system on the lifetime income distribution.
2.1 What are UISA?
The unifying element of all proposals for unemployment insurance savings accounts is that
workers (and potentially employers) are forced to save into an individual account when they are
employed, rather than paying a tax or premium. From this account individuals can draw funds
during periods of unemployment. Beyond this there are a large number of design options in a
UISA system, which we consider below.2
Savings into the UISA can be voluntary or mandatory. Mandatory savings may be necessary
to prevent individuals from claiming funds in times of unemployment via e.g. welfare beneﬁts,
sickness beneﬁts or disability beneﬁts (to the extent that individuals have a choice there).
Mandatory savings may also be necessary when there is an element of redistribution in the
system. Furthermore, mandatory savings may be called for when individuals are myopic.3
The rules for withdrawing funds like eligibility conditions, replacement rates and maximum
beneﬁt durations are typically assumed to be the same as under the UI system that is to be
replaced. When negative terminal balances are nulliﬁed (more on this below), we still need
monitoring and counselling of workers that potentially end up with a negative terminal balance.
With more lax eligibility conditions (e.g. voluntary quits) or more favourable withdrawal rights
(e.g. a higher ’replacement rate’) the group of workers that may end up with a negative account
will grow and moral hazard among this group will increase.4
An important design question is how to treat negative balances, during working life and at
retirement. When individuals can not have a negative balance at any point during their working
life, the beneﬁts from an UISA scheme as a device for intra personal redistribution are severely
2 For a discussion of the pros and cons of different choices in a UISA system see e.g. Orszag and Snower (1997), Brown
et al. (2006) and Bovenberg et al. (2008).
3 A downside of mandatory savings is that some individuals may be forced to save too much which they can not undo with
their free savings/borrowings. One way to mitigate excessive savings is to set an upper limit on the individual account
balance beyond which the individual is no longer forced to save into the UISA. Another option is to integrate the UISA with
the pension system.
4 In this respect, one type of eligibility deserves special mention: early retirement. Individuals in the Netherlands can
decide to retire early, and the system typically assumes that the UISA funds become available at retirement. Some people
fear that individuals may use UISA to retire even earlier still. However, below we will argue that the incentives under a
UISA system to retire early may very well be lower than under an UI system. The former mainly has an income effect
(typically assumed to be small) whereas the latter also has a substitution effect (typically assumed to be large, at least
relative to the income effect).
13limited and all interpersonal redistribution disappears. A scheme that does allow for negative
balances during working life increases the possibilities to use the UISA scheme for intra
personal redistribution, ’liquidity insurance’. Furthermore, one can still maintain some
interpersonal redistribution on a lifetime basis by bailing out individuals that end up with a
negative terminal balance, ’lifetime income insurance’. The downside of this is that the moral
hazard from the UI system remains for individuals who expect to end up with a negative terminal
balance. Furthermore, the taxes needed to bail out the individuals with a negative balance still
reduce the private gain from holding or ﬁnding a job. On the upside may be that the remaining
lifetime income insurance is targeted at individuals that face large or frequent unemployment
shocks, they are the ones that end up with a negative terminal balance.
Some authors suggest a scheme where the UISA tops up a minimum beneﬁt level ﬁnanced
out of taxes/premiums (Van Kuringen, 2005), or a scheme where only the withdrawals during
say the ﬁrst 6 months of unemployment (Sorensen et al., 2006) or after the ﬁrst 6 months of
unemployment (to keep the role of UI as a subsidy to search for alternative employment) are
debited to the account. In this case there will be more moral hazard but also more insurance
relative to a UISA scheme where all UI beneﬁts are part of the system.
The discussion above makes clear that there are many different ways to devise a UISA
scheme. In this paper we will focus on a scheme along the lines of Feldstein and Altman (1998).
In their scheme we have mandatory savings, entitlement conditions according to the current UI
scheme and individuals are allowed to have negative balances during their career. Furthermore,
individuals that end up with a negative terminal balance at retirement are bailed out, and this is
ﬁnanced by a tax.
2.2 The effect of UISA on lifetime incomes
To illustrate how the Feldstein and Altman (1998) UISA system works we consider how it
affects the lifetime income for the following three hypothetical individuals. Lucky Luke is a
highly educated worker who only suffers from a brief unemployment spell after ﬁnishing
university and is employed for the rest of his life. Medium Mike is a somewhat less fortunate
worker who not only suffers from an unemployment spell early in his career, but also suffers
from a longer unemployment spell later on. Finally, Tough Ted faces recurring unemployment
spells. To be more speciﬁc, we assume that all three types of workers enter the labour market at
the age of 20 and exit at the age of 60. Workers are uniformly distributed over the three types.
They all have an annual wage equal to 1 and an UI replacement rate of .7. Lucky Luke is
unemployed for one year at the age of 20, and employed for the rest of his career. Medium Mike
is unemployed at 20 and at 21, and also later on at 35 and 36, and employed in the other periods.
Tough Ted is unemployed at 20, 21, 35, 36, and also at 45 and 46. The incidence and duration of
unemployment of the three types are meant merely as an illustration.
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16Figure 2.1 gives the cumulated income gain for these three workers under a standard UI system,
ﬁnanced by a premium levied on employed workers. When individuals are employed they pay
an UI premium to ﬁnance the UI beneﬁts, in this case 6.9 percent (= 11 · 0.7/(3 · 41-11) · 100%)
covers the expenditures of the UI fund.5 All individuals are unemployed in the ﬁrst period and
hence start with an income gain from the UI system of .7. Lucky Luke is employed in all
subsequent periods and ends up paying L on net when he exits the labour market at the age of 61.
Note that this does not necessarily imply that he would not like to participate in the scheme.
When he does not know his type ex ante he may want to participate because of the lifetime
income insurance. Furthermore, even when he does know he is Lucky Luke ex ante he may still
want to participate if he can not borrow income from future periods, he is willing to pay
premiums later on to have liquidity insurance when he is 20. Medium Mike is less fortunate than
Lucky Luke, but over his working life he is a net receiver from the UI ﬁnd, he gets M on net.
Tough Ted is unemployed the most and ends up with a lifetime income gain from the UI system
of T.
When we ﬂip the vertical axis, Figure 2.1 also gives the changes in lifetime incomes when
we would shift to a system of individual accounts without bailout, with the mandatory savings
rate equal to the UI premium. In this case Lucky Luke gets to keep L at the end of his working
life, and Medium Mike and Tough Ted lose M and T respectively. This may seem identical to
abolishing unemployment insurance altogether, but there is a difference. Under a UISA system
individuals would still have access to liquidity during periods of unemployment. Hence,
although lifetime income under the UISA system without bailout would (ceteris paribus) be the
same as in the case where we abolish UI altogether, the consumption and hence the utility stream
could be different.
Figure 2.2 shows what happens to lifetime incomes when we introduce a system of
individual accounts with bailout at the end of working life. The mandatory savings rate is set
equal to the UI premium, 6.9 percent6, and to pay for the bailout the government levies a tax on
employed workers, which turns out to be 1.8 percent. Lucky Luke now gets to keep his positive
balance in the UISA at the end of working life, but still has to pay some taxes to bail out Mike
and Ted. Overall Luke now has to pay less into the system, L0, because Mike and Ted will pay
more into the system. Indeed, the mandatory savings act like a tax for Mike and Ted, because
they end up with a negative terminal balance. In addition, they now also have to contribute to the
tax to bail themselves out at the end of their career, their effective tax rate rises from 6.9 to 8.7 (=
6.9 + 1.8) percent. In fact, Mike used to be a net beneﬁciary of the UI system but now becomes a
net contributor, he now pays M0 into the system. Tough Ted still pays less into the system than
he gets out, but over his working life he now only gets T0 on net. Hence, ceteris paribus,
5 6.9 percent is rather high when compared to actual rates, the incidence and duration of unemployment used are meant
merely as an illustration.
6 Again, this is merely an illustration.
17individuals that are infrequently unemployed gain in terms of lifetime income, and individuals
that are frequently unemployed and/or for a long time lose in terms of lifetime income, when we
move to this UISA system.
Figure 2.3 gives the individual accounts when the mandatory savings rate is set higher than
the initial UI premium, to 8.0 percent (1.1 percentage points more). In this case all accounts are
more positive/less negative. Hence, expenditures on bailouts and the associated taxes to pay for
them fall, from 1.8 to 1.3 percent. Luke is even better off than under the UISA system above due
to this drop in taxes. Although Mike now ends up with a positive balance, he is still worse off
than under the original UI system. He now pays M” into the system on net, where he was
receiving M on net under the original UI scheme. Hence, ’ends up with a positive balance’ is not
equivalent to ’better off’. Ending up with a positive balance only means that you pay for your
own beneﬁts over your working life. Ted loses the most from the move to this UISA system, for
him the rise in mandatory savings is like a rise in taxes from 6.9 percent to 9.3 (= 8.0 + 1.3)
percent. In the extreme case that we set the mandatory savings rate so high that no one ends up
with a negative balance all interpersonal redistribution disappears, and we are left only with
potential intra personal redistribution over the life cycle.
Figure 2.4 gives the reverse, when we set the mandatory savings rate lower than the initial UI
premium, in this case only 1.0 percent (5.9 percentage points lower). With this low mandatory
savings rate all individuals end up with a negative balance, even Lucky Luke. Since there are no
net contributors, the forced savings rate of 1.0 percent and the tax rate for the bailout of 5.9
percent add up to the original UI premium of 6.9 percent. Indeed, with a sufﬁciently low
mandatory savings rate the system works out just like the initial UI scheme. Hence, the UI
system could be viewed as a special case of the UISA system.
2.3 Some accounting exercises using real data
A handful of studies calculate the impact of moving to a system of UISA on the lifetime income
distribution, using data on lifecycle patterns of employment and unemployment. We ﬁrst
consider the seminal study by Feldstein and Altman (1998) for the US, then consider Vodopivec
and Rejec (2002) for Estonia and conclude with the study by De Koning et al. (2006) for the
Netherlands. Unfortunately, the studies consider different setups of the UISA in terms of the
mandatory savings rate and beneﬁt levels/durations in labour markets that also differ quite a lot.
This makes it hard to compare the results. However, these studies still give some idea of the
magnitude of the lifetime income effects and the proportion of workers that ends up with a
positive/negative terminal balance with real life data.
182.3.1 Feldstein and Altman (1998) on the US
Feldstein and Altman (1998) consider the following setup for the UISA in the US. Individuals
are forced to save 4 percent of their gross wages into their UISA. Withdrawals are according to
current UI rules across US states, typically a gross replacement rate of 50 percent and a
maximum entitlement of 6 months. Furthermore, there is a ﬁve year start-up period in which
individuals contribute to their accounts, but UI beneﬁts are still ﬁnanced by the government.
Within this setup they consider ﬁve alternatives:
1. Forced savings apply to most of the wage income.
2. Forced savings only apply up to the median wage income, high wage income individuals are less
likely to be unemployed.
3. A ceiling for individual account balance of 50 percent of wage income, sufﬁcient to cover one
unemployment spell of 6 months.
4. A savings rate that depends on recent unemployment experiences, individuals that are frequently
unemployed are forced to save more.
5. Employers are forced to cover the UI beneﬁts of the ﬁrst ﬁve weeks of an unemployment spell
for employees of their (ex-)employees.
To determine the effect on lifetime income Feldstein and Altman use longitudinal data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. They consider individuals that were a household head in 1967
and follow them up to 1991 (about 25 years). Taking the transitions between employment,
unemployment and non-participation (in this case retirement) as given, they come to the
following results. Only some 5.2 (option 1) to 7.0 (option 4) percent of the household heads end
up with a negative balance at the end of the data period, whereas some 1.4 (option 4) to 2.2
(option 2) percent experience a negative balance at some point in the 25 year period but still end
up with a positive terminal account (they would beneﬁt from the ’liquidity insurance’ from the
UISA). Next they consider what this means for the tax burden. Between 44 (option 1) and 58
(option 4) percent of ’UI beneﬁt dollars’ go to individuals that end up with a positive terminal
balance. As a result, only 27 (option 1) to 39 (option 4) percent of beneﬁts paid are now ﬁnanced
by taxes, the rest is covered by individuals that end up with a positive account and by the
contributions made by individuals that end up with a negative balance when they are employed.
This drop in the tax burden will further improve employment incentives.7
Feldstein and Altman also calculate the impact on the distribution of discounted lifetime
income. As noted in the Section 2.2 above, individuals that are infrequently unemployed should
beneﬁt, and individuals that are frequently unemployed should lose, ceteris paribus. Speciﬁcally,
the latter will experience a rise in their total tax rate, since the mandatory savings are de facto a
7 A bit troubling is the assumption that for the ﬁrst 5 years (starting in 1967), individuals pay in the account but withdrawals
are tax ﬁnanced. This will make the account balances more favourable for individuals that are unemployed in the ﬁrst 5
years. Unfortunately, Feldstein and Altman do not discuss how this affects their results.
19tax for them. The lifetime income effects turn out to be rather small, the largest change across all
options is somewhat above 1 percent of mean annual income. The lowest lifetime income
quintile has a mean annual income of 12293 dollars (in 1991) and loses between 95 (option 1)
and 132 (option 3) dollars. The second and third quintile (from ’below’) are typically slightly
negative, whereas the fourth quintile with a mean annual income of 40977 dollars gains between
94 (option 1) and 151 (option 3) dollars and the ﬁfth quintile with a mean annual income of
71561 dollar gains between 438 (option 3) and 468 (option 1) dollars.
Feldstein and Altman also consider the impact on account balances and taxes when
unemployment incidence would fall as a result of the UISA system. Speciﬁcally, they consider
how a 10 respectively 30 percent reduction in unemployment affects the results for option 1
above. Let us consider the case of a 30 percent reduction in unemployment days. In this case the
share of individuals that end up with a negative terminal balance drops from 5.2 to 3.7 percent,
though still some 1.4 percent of individuals would have a negative balance at some point but not
at the end. The share of UI beneﬁts that go to individuals that end up with a negative account
drops from 44 to 33 percent. The part of UI beneﬁts that has to be ﬁnanced by the government
drops further from 27 to only 14 percent. Indeed, with this behavioural change taxes for UI
would largely disappear in the US.
2.3.2 Vodopivec and Rejec (2002) on Estonia
Vodopivec and Rejec (2002) study the impact of introducing UISA in Estonia. In their baseline
simulation they assume that the contribution rate is set to 3 percent of the gross wage up to a
maximum account balance of 3.6 months of wages, which covers a 6 month unemployment spell
with a replacement rate of 60 percent (somewhat higher than the 50 percent replacement rate in
the US).8
Vodopivec and Rejec use data from the Estonian Labor Force Survey for 1995, which covers
retrospectively the period 1989 to 1995, and the Labor Force Survey 1997 and 1998. Potential
pitfalls are recall bias and extrapolating from a period of transition to a market economy. They
use the data to construct synthetic lifecycles for workers, connecting segments of work histories
from workers with similar characteristics. They do so for two periods: the early 1990s with low
unemployment, and the late 1990s with high unemployment.
Under the low unemployment scenario 7 percent of workers end up with a negative terminal
balance. Under the high unemployment scenario this number rises to 27 percent of workers. 28
respectively 27 percent of individuals have a negative account at some point in their career but
do not end up with a negative terminal balance. Hence, a larger proportion would beneﬁt from
the ’liquidity insurance’ from this UISA in Estonia than from the UISA scheme of Feldstein and
8 A replacement rate of 60 percent is higher than under the UI system in Estonia, a ﬂat rate which Vodopivec and Rejec
calculate is less than 40 percent for the average worker.
20Altman (1998) for the US. Only 5 respectively 16 percent of all beneﬁts paid needs to be
ﬁnanced by a tax under the two scenario’s, a signiﬁcant drop in tax rates.9
Vodopivec and Rejec also consider the effects on the lifetime income distribution when
compared to a hypothetical UI system with the same replacement rate, eligibility rules etc.
Under the low-/high-unemployment scenario the lowest quintile of the lifetime income
distribution loses .6/.9 percent of their lifetime income from the move to the UISA system. The
top quintile gains 1.7/2.8 percent of their lifetime income from the move to the UISA system
under the low-/high-unemployment scenario. The distributional gains and losses for Estonia are
larger than for the US.
The analysis from Vodopivec and Rejec (2002) illustrates that for a given mandatory savings
rate and given beneﬁt levels/durations, a UISA system has a larger effect on the lifetime income
distribution when unemployment is high than when it is low. Furthermore, in the high
unemployment case more individuals end up with a negative balance and as a result less
individuals get better incentives under the UISA system. Hence, we should be careful in
extrapolating the results from Feldstein and Altman (1998) for the US to e.g. continental
European countries with typically much higher unemployment rates.
2.3.3 Studies on Dutch data
There are a number of studies that consider the effects of introducing an UISA on lifetime
incomes in the Netherlands: Rezwani and Hendrix (2002)10, Van Kuringen (2005) and De
Koning et al. (2006). Although the ﬁrst two present some interesting data, we will not consider
them below, for two reasons. First, they use only one year of data on transition probabilities to
generate synthetic lifecycles. This raises the issue to what extent their results depend on the state
of the business cycle in the year from which the data are taken and may further lead to an
underestimate of the persistence and recurrence of unemployment shocks over the lifecycle.
Second, they consider a UISA system where individuals can not borrow.11 However, the ability
to borrow is one of the key points of a UISA system, to ensure that individuals have the same
access to liquidity as under the UI system. For these two reasons we will focus on De Koning et
al. (2006) who use panel data and allow for negative balances during working life, noting that
the focus of their paper is not on individual accounts though.
Before we consider the ﬁndings of De Koning et al. (2006) it is instructive to consider some
data for OECD countries on unemployment. Over the period 1990-2004 the unemployment rate
9 They also present some sensitivity analyses. For example, they show that the introduction of a grace period of 5 years,
following Feldstein and Altman (1998), leads to a fall in the share of workers with a negative terminal balance of up to 10
percentage points.
10 See also Rezwani (2006).
11 Though some solidarity remains in both papers. In particular, Rezwani and Hendrix (2002) consider a UISA system
where individuals are still covered by UI when they have insufﬁcient savings in their UISA for the ﬁrst 6 months, and Van
Kuringen (2005) considers a UISA system with a minimum UI after 6 months of unemployment.
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was 5 percent in the Netherlands, compared to 6 percent in the US. However, hiding behind
these stocks is a huge difference in ﬂow rates. Figure 2.5 gives the average ﬂows in and out of
unemployment over the period 1990-2004 for OECD countries.12 Where the ’dynamic’ US
labour market is characterized by a high ﬂow into unemployment and a short average duration,
the ’sclerotic’ Dutch labour market is characterized by a low ﬂow into unemployment and a long
average duration. Unless the same people in the US become unemployed over and over again,
these data suggests that the unemployment risk over the lifetime is more concentrated in the
Netherlands than in the US. As a result we expect larger distributional effects of a UISA in the
Netherlands on lifetime incomes relative to the US.
De Koning et al. (2006) use data from the Dutch IPO-panel for the period 1989-2000. They
know when these individuals were working and when they were receiving some kind of beneﬁts.
12 Source: own calculations using OECD (2006). Figure 2.5 is an update of the data constructed by Blanchard and
Portugal (2001). The average unemployment duration is calculated as the total number of unemployed divided by the
inﬂow into unemployment, which is measured by the number of individuals unemployed for less than one month. The
relation above only holds for a steady state. Furthermore, we can not exclude the possibility that the data are not fully
comparable across countries. For example, the method above and the OECD data yield an average unemployment
duration for the Netherlands over the period 1990-2004 of 18 months. Some have suggested that this might be too high
for the Netherlands, but is it really? There is no ofﬁcial statistic for the Netherlands on the average unemployment
duration. However, Statistics Netherlands reports numbers of individuals in unemployment duration classes 0-5 months,
6-11 months, 12-17 months, 18-23 months and 24 months and over. When we take the average of the duration class and
40 months for the class 24 months and over we come to an average unemployment duration of 13 months for the period
2001-2005. Given that the average unemployment rate dropped from 6,6% over the period 1990-2000 to 5.2% over the
period 2001-2005 (CPB, 2007), when we assume this was all due to a drop in average duration we would come to 17
months for the 1990-2000 period, and some 16 months for the period 1990-2004, which comes close to the 18 months
from the OECD data.
22Based on these data, they calculate transition rates between employment and the different states
of non-employment for the 12-year period, and subsequently they combine the experiences of
the different groups in the data to construct synthetic lifecycles for the period from age 15 to 65.
Here we focus on the results for the synthetic lifecycles.13
For their synthetic lifecycles they consider what would happen if we introduce a mandatory
savings rate equal to the number of UI periods over the number of employed periods. Some 60
percent never claims beneﬁts and ends up with a positive balance. Another 13 percent claims
beneﬁts at some point but still ends up with a positive terminal balance. Of the remaining 27
percent, 16 percent ends up with a negative terminal balance larger in absolute terms than half on
the beneﬁts received. De Koning et al. (2006) distinguish between two groups of individuals that
end up with a negative terminal balance because they argue that the latter group will never end
up with a positive account due to behavioural changes. These results are not directly comparable
with the results for the US. In particular, beneﬁt levels and maximum beneﬁt entitlement are
much more generous in the Netherlands. But even with the same beneﬁt entitlements, insofar as
the difference in labour market ﬂows are not solely the result from differences in the UI
system14, a UISA will have a larger distributional effect on lifetime incomes in the Netherlands
than in the US.15
13 More on the 12-years data below, when we consider the calibration of our model.
14 But for example also due to differences in employment protection.
15 Then again, one could argue that this is because the distributional effect of the UI system in the Netherlands is much
larger than in the US.
23243 How can a UISA system improve welfare?
Now that we understand how a UISA works and have considered the effects on lifetime incomes
ceteris paribus, we now turn to the question of how a UISA can improve welfare. The literature
on individual accounts suggests that there are at least two ways in which a UISA can improve
welfare: i) more efﬁcient liquidity insurance, and ii) more efﬁcient lifetime income insurance.
Two recent papers provide a thorough analysis of the relevant mechanisms. Stiglitz and Yun
(2005) focus on ’liquidity insurance’, whereas Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004) also consider
lifetime income insurance. We consider the setup and some key ﬁndings of both papers below.16
3.1 Stiglitz and Yun (2005)
Stiglitz and Yun (2005) show that the option to borrow against future income can improve
welfare when workers run a risk of unemployment. Their setup is as follows. In the ﬁrst period
all individuals are working. In the second period individuals run the risk of becoming
unemployed. The risk of unemployment consists of an exogenous shock and a job search
decision by the worker who takes a random draw from a search cost distribution. After the
second period everybody is employed again, independent of whether they were employed or
unemployed in the second period, for many periods up to retirement. The motivation for this
setup is that a large share of unemployment spells occurs when individuals are young, and
liquidity constraints may be particularly relevant for young unemployed who did not have time
to build up a large enough buffer stock of savings and may not be able to borrow against the
future returns of their human capital. Furthermore, by including an initial employed period
Stiglitz and Yun are also able to study the interaction with precautionary savings.
In this setting, Stiglitz and Yun ﬁrst consider the optimal level of unemployment insurance
when there are no capital market imperfections. The optimal level of unemployment insurance is
lower when individuals are less risk averse, when the elasticity of unemployment with respect to
the UI beneﬁt level is higher and when the duration of unemployment is relatively short
compared to the rest of working life.
Next, they consider whether it makes sense to give individuals access to their future pension
beneﬁts when they become unemployed, integrating the UI system with the pension system. We
could see this as a UISA where beneﬁts are topped up by a loan, but without bailout. Giving
individuals access to their future pension beneﬁts only makes sense when individuals are credit
constrained, otherwise they can implement the optimal saving/borrowing scheme themselves.
The point of allowing individuals to borrow is then that "... a perfect capital market allows an
16 Since we are going to discuss another model in Section 5 below, we keep the analysis here informal. For the interested
reader, Appendix 1 considers optimal UI in a ﬁrst-best world, in a second-best world and the ’third-best’ of UISA when
there are liquidity constraints, in a simple setup with only two periods and two outcomes.
25individual to spread out the reduction in lifetime income over the working and retirement periods
and thus to reduce the risk burden associated with incomplete provision of insurance against
unemployment. This is how the capital market perfection improves the trade-off between
insurance and incentive, thereby enhancing welfare." (Stiglitz and Yun, 2005, p. 2049)
So the question is then whether or not the credit constraint is binding for unemployed in their
model? First of all, this is more likely to hold for unemployed youngsters, hence the modelling
choice. Furthermore, the young unemployed are more likely to be credit constrained when
optimal UI beneﬁts are low and when they have less opportunities to save in the ﬁrst period for
unemployment due to e.g. high mandatory pension savings. For beneﬁts they argue that the
reserve is also true "[I]n the absence of integration, the "third best" levels of ﬁrst period savings
and unemployment beneﬁts will be higher than they would be in the constrained optimum with
integration." (Stiglitz and Yun, 2005, p. 2053) We consider the empirical relevance of credit
constraints for the unemployed below in Section 4.17
3.2 Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004)
Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004) show that next to more efﬁcient liquidity insurance individual
unemployment accounts can also provide lifetime income insurance more efﬁciently than a tax
ﬁnanced UI system. In their setup there is no initial employment period, but they add additional
heterogeneity by introducing a potential scarring effect of unemployment on subsequent wages.
There are three types of individuals: i) employed in both periods (’high income individuals’), ii)
unemployed in the ﬁrst period, employed but not scarred in the second period (’medium income
individuals’) and iii) unemployed in the ﬁrst period, employed but scarred in the second period
(’low income individuals’). The probability of becoming unemployed depends on initial search
effort. In the second period individuals can choose their working hours/employment duration.
Bovenberg and Sorensen show that replacing part of UI beneﬁts in the ﬁrst period by a loan
can improve welfare. The ability to borrow reduces the need for more distortionary insurance, as
in Stiglitz and Yun (2005). On top of this Bovenberg and Sorensen show that individual accounts
can give more efﬁcient lifetime income insurance. However, for UI this seems an artefact of
their model setup. Individuals are unemployed in the ﬁrst period and employed in the second
period. They can pay for the beneﬁts in the ﬁrst period with a lump sum payment from their
17 Stiglitz and Yun also consider some extensions of their analysis informally. One potential complication is myopic
behaviour, in which case the borrowed funds might still be perceived as a subsidy, and welfare analysis becomes difﬁcult
when there are multiple selves over the lifecycle. They further note that one also has to look at distributional effects, in
their model all workers are homogeneous ex ante, though they argue that the distributional effects could in principle be
dealt with by an explicit redistribution scheme across groups of workers with different risk proﬁles. They also consider the
option of integrating not only unemployment and lifetime risk but also other risks into one individual savings account.
Indeed, they argue that "[U]nless the risks are perfectly positively correlated, ..., the integrated lifetime insurance system
will always bring some welfare gain." (Stiglitz and Yun, 2005, p. 2065, emphasis in original text) For the case of individual
accounts for various risks see e.g. Orszag and Snower (1997) and Sorensen et al. (2008).
26individual account or with a marginal tax. The latter then distorts labour supply in the second
period whereas the former does not. The question is if this generalizes to a multi-period setting
where individuals move between employment and unemployment. When, as in e.g. the
Netherlands, not only UI premiums but also potential UI beneﬁts rise with hours worked it is not
directly clear the UI system distorts hours worked (the ’intensive margin’).18 Hence, the ’more
efﬁcient lifetime income insurance’ argument seems questionable. This is also the reason why
we do not consider endogenous working hours in the model in Section 5 below. The ’more
efﬁcient liquidity insurance’ argument remains however. Below we consider the empirical
relevance of liquidity constraints for the unemployed. Speciﬁcally, we review the handful of
papers that looks at this question directly, and the handful of papers that looks at this indirectly
by considering the impact of unemployment on consumption. Furthermore, we also consider
how distortionary UI actually is in terms of increasing the use of UI.
18 A similar observation is made in the related paper by Bovenberg et al. (2008, p.73 and footnote 3) "[B]y linking beneﬁts
to contributions in an actuarially fair way, the savings accounts reduce the tax wedge on labor income. Social security
contributions essentially become beneﬁt taxes. ... To the extent that existing social-security contributions ﬁnance
wage-linked beneﬁts, they are in fact already, at least in part, beneﬁt taxes."
27284 Empirical studies into the costs and beneﬁts of UI, and
liquidity constraints
Below, we consider the costs and beneﬁts of UI and the relevance of liquidity constraints for the
unemployed, all of which are relevant for the impact of a UISA. In Section 6 below, we use this
information in the calibration of the model for unemployment risk over the lifecycle.
4.1 The costs of insurance
Layard et al. (1991) reading from the ’older’ literature was that a 1 percent increase in beneﬁts
raises unemployment durations by .2 to .9 percent. Holmlund (1998, p.120) is more cautious and
suggests that "the "beneﬁt effect" is hardly a ﬁrmly established parameter." Indeed, he cites some
studies that ﬁnd no or even reverse effects, and gives some rationale for this (for example,
individuals are only entitled to UI after a period of employment). He suggests that we should be
careful given that there are few natural experiments when it comes to variations in UI beneﬁts.
The more recent literature survey of Krueger and Meyer (2002) suggest a value of .5. An
interesting recent paper by Chetty (2008) suggests that UI beneﬁts only increase unemployment
durations for individuals that have no assets and no partner, i.e. for unemployed that are more
likely to be credit constrained.
Studies on the impact of maximum beneﬁt durations also typically ﬁnd a positive effect on
unemployment durations. For example, Katz and Meyer (1990) ﬁnd that one more week of UI
beneﬁts raises average unemployment durations by one day in the US. Card and Levine (2000)
ﬁnd .5 days per extra week of beneﬁts for the US whereas Lalive and Zweimuller (2004) ﬁnd .4
days extra per week for beneﬁts in Austria. The positive relation between beneﬁt duration and
unemployment duration is also supported by cross-country studies, see e.g. Nickell and Layard
(1999). Lalive et al. (2004) show that the ﬁndings on the effect of maximum beneﬁt durations is
more mixed for studies on European data (though most ﬁnd a positive effect), and they review a
substantial number of recent studies. They further suggest that more recent studies (that take into
account unobserved heterogeneity, which is typically not the case for older studies) ﬁnd on
average a larger effect (a range of .35 to 1.7) than the older studies (a range of .1 to 1.0).
For the Netherlands, Van den Berg (1990) ﬁnds that the elasticity of the unemployment
duration with respect to the level of UI is about .1, and the elasticity of the unemployment
duration with respect to the level of unemployment assistance ranges from .1 for high-educated
workers to .5 for low-educated workers. Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993) estimate the effect of
the beneﬁt level and the remaining beneﬁt duration on the exit rate from UI. They do not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant effect of the beneﬁt level, but they note that this may be due to limited variation in the
UI variable and collinearity among the explanatory variables. They ﬁnd that shortening
maximum UI entitlement by one week reduces the expected unemployment duration by 1.3
29weeks. In a recent study on Dutch data, Bloemen (2008) ﬁnds an elasticity of unemployment
duration with respect to the beneﬁt level in the range of .35 to .5.
Returning to the US, another type of ’moral hazard’ from UI works via spousal labour
supply. Cullen and Gruber (2000) consider the extent to which UI crowds out insurance via
spousal labour supply. They ﬁnd that for every UI dollar the breadwinner receives, the spouse
works some 70 dollar cents less, quite a sizeable effect. Spousal labour supply as insurance
against unemployment may become increasingly relevant in the Netherlands given the steep rise
in female participation since the mid 1980s.
Finally, UI beneﬁts may further increase unemployment by increasing labour costs and hence
reducing labour demand, either directly through higher UI premiums or indirectly via higher
wage claims by workers in the wage bargain, see e.g. the meta analysis in Folmer (2009). Using
a CGE model for the Netherlands which includes a wage bargaining model De Mooij et al.
(2006) ﬁnd that a 10 percent reduction in UI and unemployment assistance reduces
unemployment by 7 percent, with a signiﬁcant contribution from the drop in wages to the overall
drop in unemployment.
4.2 The beneﬁts of insurance
4.2.1 Consumption smoothing
There are only a few papers that consider the insurance gains from UI empirically. Using data on
food consumption in the US, Gruber (1997) ﬁnds that a transition into unemployment is
associated with a sizeable drop in income of 6.8 percent, whereas remaining employed has only
a very small positive effect on consumption. What is the role of UI in this drop? His estimations
suggest that when we reduce UI beneﬁts by 10 percent, consumption in unemployment would
drop by 2.7 percent. He also calculates the effect when the replacement rate would go to zero, in
which case consumption would drop by 22-26 percent. This implies that there is an insurance
gain from UI. However, at the same time this also implies that individuals have other means to
smooth income over the states of employment and unemployment.
Engen and Gruber (2001) ﬁnd that the decline in consumption is 21 percent of the decline in
beneﬁts. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that reducing UI has a larger effect for single heads than for
married heads, consistent with the idea that spousal labour supply gives additional insurance (see
above).
Browning and Crossley (2001) study the consumption smoothing gains of UI using data for
Canada. An important extension is that they use information on asset holdings. They ﬁnd only a
small average consumption effect from UI, a fall in the replacement rate by 10 percentage points
reduces total consumption by some .8 percent on average. However, this effect is concentrated
among individuals with no assets at the start of the unemployment spell. A drop in UI of 10
percentage points decreases consumption by 2.9 percent for this group (reducing UI by 1 dollar
30reduces expenditures by 25 dollar cents). They further ﬁnd that breadwinners without a working
spouse show a larger consumption response, though the effect for singles is insigniﬁcant.19
Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005) study the impact of job loss on food consumption using UK
data. They ﬁnd that job loss is associated with a drop in food consumption of 17 percent, with a
larger drop for households with zero or negative ﬁnancial wealth. For the whole sample, the
replacement rate does not have a signiﬁcant effect on the drop in consumption. However, for
individuals that have no positive wealth lower replacement rates increase the drop in food
consumption, with a 10 percent fall in the replacement rate resulting in a 2 percent fall in food
consumption (for single-earner households).
4.2.2 Studies on the importance of liquidity constraints
The studies by Chetty (2008) into the costs of UI in terms of moral hazard, and the studies by
Browning and Crossley (2001) and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005) into the beneﬁts of UI in
terms of consumption smoothing suggest that UI mainly affects individuals that face liquidity
constraints. We have no empirical studies into UI that distinguish between individuals with and
without assets for the Netherlands. Indeed, there are no empirical studies into the consumption
effects of Dutch UI. To get some idea of the relevance of liquidity constraints for the
unemployed in the Netherlands we consider two studies that look at comparable data for the
Netherlands, the US and Italy: Crook and Hochguertel (2005) and Kapteyn and Panis (2003).
Crook and Hochguertel (2005) consider household debt holdings and the role of credit
constraints. They have data for both the demand and supply side of the market for credit (credit
applications and credit approvals). First they consider the ’demand side’, credit applications.
They ﬁnd that in the Netherlands, and even more so in the US, unemployed individuals are less
likely to apply for credit. This does not support the hypothesis that unemployed individuals use
credit to smooth their income. However, they can not exclude the possibility that this is the result
of constraints from the supply side.20
Next, Crook and Hochguertel consider the supply side, whether credit is denied or less credit
is given than demanded. They ﬁnd that being unemployed has a small, positive yet insigniﬁcant
effect on the probability of being denied credit in the Netherlands. The effect is signiﬁcant and
larger in some speciﬁcations for Italy and the US. Furthermore, having an unpaid job does
increase the probability of a credit application being rejected in the Netherlands. Perhaps UI
19 Consumption is measured as expenditures. Browning and Crossley (2001) note that the drop in expenditures may be
all in reduced expenditures on durables. This may have little effect on consumption, individuals simply continue to live with
the old durables that depreciate slowly, and hence so does the consumption stream resulting from them. Unemployment
then merely shifts the purchase of durables backwards. They present evidence for this mechanism in the data of Browning
and Crossley (2000). Hence, the effect on expenditures may still overstate the effect on consumption.
20 Some other ﬁndings of some relevance to this study are that credit applications fall with wealth (unsurprisingly) and
age, and when current income is above permanent income, in line with the standard lifecycle model of consumption and
savings. Income and education do not seem to have a signiﬁcant effect on the probability of a credit application in the
Netherlands.
31beneﬁts and durations are so generous that we do not notice the liquidity constraints that might
surface when we signiﬁcantly reduce UI generosity. Then again, individuals in unpaid jobs and
unemployed workers are probably quite different groups as well, so perhaps we should not read
too much into this.21
Crook and Hochguertel conclude with an analysis of debt holdings, e.g. the result of demand
and supply. In all three countries the unemployed seem to hold less debt conditional on the other
variables, though the effect is insigniﬁcant for Italy and the US and only borderline signiﬁcant
for the Netherlands. Whether this is because individuals do not demand (additional) credit
during unemployment, or whether this is the result of credit constraints seems still largely an
open question. Overall, a fair conclusion of Crook and Hochguertel (2005) seems to be that there
is no strong evidence that unemployed workers run into credit constraints, though this may in
part be the result of the generosity of the UI system.
Kapteyn and Panis (2003) seek to explain differences in asset holdings in the Netherlands,
Italy and the US. Their analysis is not as detailed as Crook and Hochguertel (2005). In
particular, they do not consider the unemployed separately. They argue that overall liquidity
constraints are more important in Italy than in the Netherlands or the US.
Summarizing, most studies ﬁnd that higher UI beneﬁts lead to higher unemployment. A recent
study by Chetty (2008) suggests that the ’moral hazard’ is concentrated among individuals that
are credit constrained. There is also some evidence that UI beneﬁts help to smooth consumption
over periods of employment and unemployment, where again the smoothing gains are
concentrated among individuals that are credit constrained. Empirical studies for the Netherlands
also ﬁnd that higher UI beneﬁts increase unemployment. However, there are no studies on
smoothing gains of UI for the Netherlands nor do the available studies distinguish between those
individuals that are and those that are not credit constrained. The few papers that look at liquidity
constraints directly do not suggest a signiﬁcant role for credit constraints for Dutch unemployed,
though this may in part be due to the relatively generous UI system in the Netherlands.
21 Other ﬁndings are that income and education do not have a signiﬁcant effect on the probability of credit denial in the
Netherlands.
325 A lifecycle model with unemployment risk
To study the impact of introducing a system of UISA on the workings of the labour market and
the welfare of individuals we construct a simple lifecycle model. We calibrate the model to
Dutch data on the incidence and duration of unemployment and the ﬁndings in the international
literature on the elasticity of beneﬁt use and consumption with respect to unemployment beneﬁts
and on the extent of risk aversion.
In the construction of the model we used the following criteria. First, the model has to
contain the main mechanisms through which UI and UISA affect the workings of the economy.
In particular, we want to have risk averse agents so as to have insurance gains/losses, moral
hazard to prevent full insurance, and an endogenous consumption/saving decision to study the
interaction between free savings, UI and mandatory savings. Furthermore, we want to have the
option of binding liquidity constraints. Second, we want the model to be parsimonious but also
realistic. To keep the results tractable we divide the lifecycle into only four phases, and shocks
occur only at the beginning of each of the ﬁrst three phases. Still, we believe this setup below
captures enough heterogeneity in unemployment patterns over the lifecycle for a meaningful
analysis of UISA. Indeed, we are able to take into account the differences in unemployment rates
and durations between and within our groups of young, middle aged and older workers. As a
result the distribution of potential terminal balances is in line with the ﬁndings of De Koning et
al. (2006).
5.1 General setup of the model
Figure 5.1 gives the lifecycle phases we distinguish and the shocks that may occur. After
entering the labour market individuals go through four phases: i) youth, ii) middle age, iii) old
age and iv) retirement. All phases are of equal length N. At labour market entry individuals draw
a search technology with three possible outcomes: i) employment, ii) short-term unemployment,
or iii) long-term unemployment. The ’employed’ draw a such a favourable search technology
that given their optimal search effort they immediately ﬁnd a job and hence are employed all
through their ’young’ phase. The ’short-term unemployed’ draw a search technology so that it is
optimal for them to be short-term unemployed for stuyN periods and employed for the
remaining part of their young phase. Similarly, the ’long-term unemployed’ draw a search
technology so that given their search technology it is optimal to be long-term unemployed for
ltuyN periods and employed for the remaining part of their young phase.
At the start of the middle age and also at the start of the old age phase individuals draw
another search technology with again the three possible outcomes of employment, short-term
unemployment and long-term unemployment. For simplicity we assume that the probability of
33Figure 5.1 Phases and shocks in the model
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drawing one of the three outcomes does not depend on the draws in the past22, though
subsequent decisions/unemployment durations do depend on the realizations in the past through
asset holdings (but this effect is small). There is no uncertainty beyond the old age period,
individuals enter the retirement phase after which life ends. In all phases individuals have to
choose their optimal consumption and savings proﬁle, given the technology and policy
parameters. In the ﬁrst three phases they also have to choose their optimal search effort. We
consider the optimisation problem for the individual and the resulting ﬁrst-order conditions for
(privately) optimal behaviour below.23
22 In the calibration below, we do use data on the concentration of the unemployment risk over a 12-year period, but we
have no information on the correlation of the unemployment risk between these 12-year periods. However, empirical
studies suggest that individuals that were unemployed in the past are more likely to become unemployed again in the
future, see e.g. Heckman and Borjas (1980), and our model may understate the concentration of the unemployment risk
over the lifecycle.
23 It may be important to note that there is no uncertainty on the unemployment duration once the search technology is
drawn. As most other papers that deal with unemployment insurance over the lifecycle (Bovenberg and Sorensen, 2004,
Stiglitz and Yun, 2005, Crossley and Low, 2005, but for example not Hopenhayn and Hatchondo, 2002) we assume that at
the start of the unemployment shock the duration of unemployment is known with certainty. This precludes a meaningful
analysis of the time proﬁle of unemployment beneﬁts (see e.g. Shavell and Weiss, 1979, Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997,
and Shimer and Werning, 2008). Indeed, in our setup the government could achieve the ﬁrst-best by setting up a system
with initial transfers depending on the search technology draw. We assume that this is not possible and instead consider
only a ’second-best’ setting where the government sets the beneﬁt level and the individual has some control over how
many beneﬁts he or she gets by choosing the search effort. For the moment we leave a model with uncertain
unemployment durations as a topic for future research.
345.2 Labour market entry











dy = 1, dy ∈ {emp,stu,ltu}. (5.1)
where the superscript y indicates the lifecycle phase and the subscript d indicates the search
technology draw (employed, short-term unemployed or long-term unemployed), ρ
y
dy are the
probabilities of drawing the respective technologies andV
y
dy are the associated remaining
lifetime utilities at the start of the young phase.
5.3 Young
For the young we consider three setups in turn, adding more complexity in each step. First we
consider optimal behaviour given UI and in the absence of credit constraints. Next, we consider
optimal behaviour given UI but then with credit constraints. Finally, we consider optimal
behaviour given UISA and credit constraints.
5.3.1 UI and no credit constraints
After drawing a search technology young individuals decide on their optimal search effort e
y
dy,
consumption path c(s) and end-of-period assets a
y











































where u(.) is instantaneous utility, e
y
dy is the search effort for search technology draw dy, γ is a
parameter to steer the marginal utility cost of search, E[Vm
dm(a
y
dy)] is expected remaining utility in
middle age, which depends on the search technology draw dm in middle age and the (potentially
negative) assets an individual takes from the young period to the middle age period. αdy is the
search technology associated with draw dy, a scale parameter that translates a given amount of
search effort into a given reduction in the unemployment periods during the young phase, with
the unemployment period during the young phase equal to (1−αdye
y
dy)N. Furthermore, by are
per period UI beneﬁts when young, wy are per period gross wages when young, and t1 is the
linear tax rate for the taxes used to ﬁnance UI beneﬁts (see below). For simplicity we set the
discount rate and the interest rate on assets equal to zero.24
24 More on this below in Section 7.
35The value function depends on the sum of instantaneous utilities when young, the cost of search
and expected future utility which depends on the choice of end-of-period assets. Note that the
beneﬁts of search only enter via the ’budget constraint’ for a
y
dy, with a higher effort e
y
dy reducing
the time spent in unemployment and thereby increasing lifetime income. Below we will see that
there is an additional gain from search when individuals are credit constrained during
unemployment.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal consumption, end-of-period assets and search effort for

































The ﬁrst-order condition for consumption (5.3) shows that after a shock has been realized,
consumption will be constant until the next shock. From the optimal choice of end-of-period
assets (5.4) it follows that consumption will be set so that marginal utility of consumption when
young equals expected marginal utility of consumption when middle aged, given the draw dy
when young. Below we will see that the derivative of the value function for the middle aged with
respect to end-of-period assets when young equals the marginal utility of consumption in middle
age. The ﬁrst-order condition for search effort (5.5) shows that the individual will increase
search effort until the marginal cost of doing so (the left hand side) equals the marginal increase
in lifetime income times the marginal utility of consumption when young. Since we do not allow
negative unemployment periods, optimal search effort hits a corner at 1
αdy beyond which search
is fruitless. Individuals that draw the ’employed’ search technology are at this corner, they
immediately ﬁnd a job at the start of the period. However, if the replacement rate would go to 1
they too would choose to remain unemployed for some time. We further assume that effort has
to be positive, but this is never a binding constraint in our simulations. From the ﬁrst-order
condition for search it is also clear how tax ﬁnanced UI beneﬁts distort search effort. Both the
beneﬁt by and the associated taxes t1 draw a wedge between the private and the social gains from
additional job search. However, since UI beneﬁts also imply a redistribution from individuals
with a lower marginal utility of consumption (employed) to individuals with a higher marginal
utility of consumption (short- and long-term unemployed) UI beneﬁts may still be welfare
improving (increase E[V0]).
5.3.2 Credit constraint for the unemployed
Next, we consider the optimisation problem for a young worker when he or she is credit
constrained during periods of unemployment. For simplicity we will assume the extreme case
36where a young unemployed individual can not borrow at all against future income.25 Individuals
start with zero assets and beneﬁts are lower than future wages, hence the credit constraint is
indeed binding.26























































The individual is now forced to consume only by during the initial unemployment period. The


















































The individual can only consume by while unemployed, and consumes a constant c
y
dy in the
remainder of the young phase. Marginal utility of consumption during the subsequent employed
period is equalized with expected marginal utility in middle age. The search effort of the
individual will be higher when the unemployed is faced with a binding credit constraint. Search
now not only generates more lifetime income, but in this case also allows the individual to
smooth his or her consumption over the unemployed and the employed period. This smoothing






dy −b) which is positive since we
assume that agents are risk averse (u”(.) < 0). The model is in line with the ﬁndings of Chetty
25 Given the empirical ﬁndings on the consumption smoothing gains from UI this probably causes us to overstate the
insurance gains from UI. Then again, for the elderly we may understate the relevance of liquidity constraints since we
assume they have full access to their pension wealth. On average, the consumption response to changes in the UI beneﬁt
level is in line with the empirical studies from Section 4, see the calibration below.
26 In the calibration we will assume a rising wage proﬁle which makes matters even worse for the credit constrained,
individuals would like to bring more income from with low marginal utility from future periods to the present with high
marginal utility but they can not. Note that this potentially leads to an optimal replacement rate larger than 1 in the model.
27 For simplicity we do not use separate notation to distinguish these optimal choices and hence also t1 from the ones
above.
37(2008) that suggest that beneﬁts affect the search behaviour of credit constrained unemployed
more than unconstrained unemployed.
5.3.3 With individual savings accounts
Finally, we consider the optimisation problem for a young worker who is credit constrained, but
now under a UISA system of the type we studied in Section 2. The individual is forced to save p
of his or her gross wage into an individual account when working and beneﬁts by are debited to
this account. Negative terminal account balances at retirement are nulliﬁed and this is ﬁnanced
by a linear tax on wage income t2.








































































dy are end-of-period assets in the mandatory individual savings account, which may
































































The interesting novelty is in the condition for optimal search effort. The term φ
y
dy is the value of
an additional unit in the individual savings account. This gives different incentives for job search
for individuals that expect to end up with a positive terminal account and those that expect to end
up with a negative terminal account.
























For them, both the tax t2 and the mandatory savings p drive a wedge between the social and
private return from job search. And since p plus t2 is typically larger than t1 this implies that
their incentives for job search will be reduced.
Next, consider individuals that expect to end up with a positive terminal account. Their

























after some rearrangements. Suppose for simplicity that u0(cr) = u0(c
y
dy). The condition above
then shows that in this case the wedge from beneﬁts and mandatory savings in the job search
decision disappears. What remains is the distortion from t2 which is typically smaller than t1.28
Now, individuals do not expect to end up negative or positive in all lifecycle paths, hence the
incentives in the model are a mixture from these two cases, depending on past and future draws
of the search technology. Furthermore, although the net effect on incentives is not directly clear,
below in the calibrated model we will see that most individuals end up with a positive terminal
balance and the net effect on incentives is positive.
Finally, it is important to realize that the effect of introducing UISA on search effort will be
smaller than an equivalent drop in lifetime income due to lower beneﬁts. Lower beneﬁts not only
reduce lifetime income but also make credit constraints more pressing. The introduction of
UISA does not increase the difference in consumption during unemployment and employment,
and thus does not ’beneﬁt’ in terms of additional search effort from more unequal consumption.
Hence, we should be careful in using an empirical elasticity from changes in beneﬁts to the case
of UISA. Indeed, Chetty (2008) suggests that most of the effect of lower beneﬁts works via the
credit constraint that becomes more pressing. Sorensen et al. (2006) use a rather conservative
elasticity of unemployment with respect to beneﬁts of .1 in calculating the effects of introducing
UISA in Denmark. The analysis above suggests that they are right in doing so.
28 When individuals are myopic they may still perceive the mandatory savings as a tax and the beneﬁt as a subsidy,
something we take up in Section 7.
395.4 Middle age
Next, the individual enters the middle age phase. In middle age we assume that unemployed
individuals no longer face liquidity constraints, in part motivated by the empirical studies above.
Furthermore, in the base simulations with homogeneous agents middle aged and old aged
individuals never have negative assets, so we might as well assume that they are also potentially
credit constrained, but this constraint is never binding.29 We further do not consider the case
with and without UISA separately, zero forced savings is a special case that brings us back to the
UI system. We assume that the search technology draw dm in middle age is independent of the
draw dy when young, for simplicity and because we lack the data to study the relation between
the two. The only thing individuals take with them from the young to the middle age phase are
the free savings (or deﬁcit) and the forced savings (or deﬁcit) in the individual account. The
probability to draw dm is ρm
dm where dm ∈ {emp,stu,ltu}. The search technology draw is again
exogenous (there are no endogenous separations).












































where do is the technology draw in old age, and E[Vo
do(am
dm,uisam
dm)] is expected remaining
lifetime utility in old age.







































Although past realizations do not have a direct effect on the probability of unemployment, they
do affect the search effort of workers in middle age via the asset position in an individual’s ’free’
29 But this is under the assumption that they have full access to the assets that they accumulate for the retirement period.
40and mandatory individual account. In particular, when an individual starts the middle age phase
with more free savings consumption will be higher and hence the marginal utility from search
will be lower. This effect on search effort is small however. More important is the asset position
in the mandatory savings account. When an individual starts with a more favourable UISA in the
middle age phase, because he or she was employed in the young phase, the more likely it is that
he or she ends up with a positive terminal balance in the UISA. In this case the wedge from
beneﬁts and mandatory savings disappears in (5.18), and the search effort will be higher.






dm), so the value of
shifting one unit of assets to the future when young indeed equals the expected marginal utility






dm, so the three φ
y
dy associated with the
three outcomes for dy branch into nine φm
dm in the middle aged phase, one for each combination
of dy and dm.
5.5 Old age
Individuals then enter the old age period, which is the last working phase before retirement. Also
for old age we assume there are no liquidity constraints.30 Furthermore, after the individual
draws do there is no uncertainty left for the remainder of the lifecycle. After the old age period
there is only retirement and the end of life in the model. The probability to draw do is ρo
do where
do ∈ {emp,stu,ltu}. This search technology draw is also exogenous to the individual.










































do ≤ 1. (5.20)



























30 Which in at least in the base calibration with homogeneous agents is never binding anyway, but assuming that pension









Again, after the shock has occurred consumption will be constant, and marginal utility is equated
with (now certain) marginal utility in retirement by choosing the optimal asset level at the end of
the period. Furthermore, the search effort again depends negatively on the wedge created by
mandatory savings, taxes and beneﬁts. But the wedge caused by mandatory savings and beneﬁts
is nulliﬁed when the individual ends up with a positive terminal account balance in the UISA.












middle age branches again into three φo
do in old age, so 27 in total, one for each combination of
search technology draw in the young, middle and old age phase.
5.6 Retirement
















This implies that when the terminal account balance in the UISA is positive (uisao ≥ 0) we have
∂Vr(.)
∂uisao




o = 0. So the φ’s that branch out in each working life phase, are actually expected
marginal utility’s of consumption in retirement of an additional unit in the UISA.
5.7 Equilibrium
Next to consistent optimal choices for consumption, end-of-period assets and search effort, an
equilibrium further requires that the tax rate is set so that tax receipts cover the UI beneﬁts or
negative terminal balances under the UISA. We assume that the population is constant, there is
no discounting and the four phases of the life-cycle are of equal length. The tax rate that
balances the budget is then simply the sum of the negative terminal balances over the gross
earned income of employed workers in all working lifecycle phases (note that the terminal
balances are the cumulative result of the preceding three lifecycle phases). Note also that the UI
system is just a UISA system with mandatory savings p = 0, so we can use the same procedure
for the UI and the UISA system.
426 Simulations
We calibrate the model above to Dutch data and run various simulations for an UI system and a
UISA system. We do this exercise ﬁrst for an economy populated by ex ante homogeneous
agents and then consider an economy with ex ante heterogeneity in the level of education and the
associated differences in wage proﬁles and probabilities of becoming and remaining
unemployed. For both models we consider the optimal replacement rate of UI, the impact of
introducing a system of individual accounts, and the optimal mix of mandatory savings and
insurance. For the economy with ex ante heterogeneity we consider the effect on expected utility
per type of education and overall. For both models types we also consider the impact of the
presence or absence of liquidity constraints, and for the model with ex ante homogeneous agents
we also consider the impact of a different value for risk aversion, the elasticity of the use of UI
with respect to the beneﬁt level and an economy where the ﬂows are twice as high (i.e. to
compare the effect in a ’dynamic’ US style economy and a ’sclerotic’ continental European style
economy).
6.1 Ex ante homogeneous agents
6.1.1 Calibration
The instantaneous utility function is characterized by constant relative risk aversion u(c) = c1−θ
1−θ
with θ > 0, so that u0(c) = c−θ and u”(c) < 0.31 The empirical literature on risk aversion and
intertemporal substitution suggests .5, 2 and 4 are all reasonable parameter choices for θ, see e.g.
Gollier (2001, Chapter 2).32 In our base calibration we use a value of 2, but later on we also
consider a value of 4, to see how sensitive the results are to the degree of risk aversion.
Ter Rele (2007) gives net wage proﬁles for a number of education groups in 2002, see Figure
6.1 below. For the young period we take the average wage of individuals aged 24-35, for the
medium period ages 36-47, and for the old period ages 48-59.33 This gives the following
monthly wages for the young, middle age and old age phase respectively: 1460, 1920 and 2240
euro. For simplicity we ignore technological progress and discounting and simply take the
cross-section of net wages across ages in 2002 reported by Ter Rele (2007). Excluded from net
wages are pension premiums, so total compensation is too low, but assuming that pension
premiums are basically a constant proportion of the net wage, these wage proﬁles are a good
approximation of total compensation proﬁles.
31 For simplicity we do not use e.g. Epstein-Zin preferences to disentangle intertemporal substitution and risk aversion.
32 In Hopenhayn and Hatchondo (2002) relative risk aversion ranges from .5 for low wage workers to 4 for high wage
worker, where the values differ because they use an instantaneous utility function with constant absolute risk aversion.
33 We do not take wages from before 24 and after 59 because it seems that low participation rates causes outliers to have
a large impact on average wages for those age groups.
























Low Medium High Average
Table 6.1 Data from De Koning et al. (2006) on the probability of and time spent in UI: 1989-2000
UI users Time in UI by users Time in UI UI users > 2 year UI
Gender
Male .20 .15 .029 .26
Female .14 .15 .021 .28
Year of birth
1970-1985 .17 .10 .017 .09
1960-1969 .28 .10 .029 .19
1950-1959 .17 .14 .023 .32
1940-1949 .13 .19 .025 .46
1925-1939 .08 .40 .032 .72
Education indicatora
Low .23 .18 .042 .37
Medium .25 .12 .031 .22
High .18 .10 .018 .17
a The sample is divided into three groups of equal size according to their income, those with the lowest incomes are in the low education
group and those with the highest incomes are in the high education group. As noted by De Koning et al. (2006) this may mistakenly put
high educated women that work part-time in the medium or low educated group.
44Table 6.2 Parameter values and calibration outcomes
Parameter values
’Employed’ ’Short-term unemployed’ ’Long-term unemployed’
UI incidence ρ
- young .79 .18 .03
- middle age .82 .12 .06
- old age .90 .04 .06
Replacement rate b/w .7
’Search elasticity’ γ 30.
Risk aversion θ 2.
Time units per phase N 168.
Wages
- young wy 1.46
- middle age wm 1.92
- old age wo 2.24
Calibration outcomes
’Employed’ ’Short-term unemployed’ ’Long-term unemployed’
UI duration (in months)
- young 0 12 50
- middle age 0 15 42
- old age 0 18 76
UI rate (in %) 2.63
- young 2.18
- middle age 2.57
- old age 3.14
Tax rate t2 1.94
To calibrate the incidence and duration of unemployment we use data from De Koning et al.
(2006), part of which is reproduced in Table 6.1. Table 6.1 gives the incidence of UI, the average
share of time spent in UI, and the share of UI users that use more than 2 years of UI, for their
sample for the period 1989-2000. They report data by gender, year of birth and an indicator for
education. The data in Table 6.1 indicate that men are more likely to use some UI than women.34
For those that do use UI, men and women spend about an equal amount of time in UI during the
12-year period, and the share of ’long-term’ UI users (> 2 years) is about the same as well.
Regarding age, we see that older workers are less likely to enter UI than younger workers.
However, when older workers use UI they use more of it than younger workers, which we can
also see from the share of older ’long-term’ UI users, in particular the cohorts born in
1925-1939. For the overall use of UI in days per worker for the 12-year period , older workers
seem to claim more UI than younger workers. Regarding education, lower educated workers are
34 Which may be due to the higher eligibility of men due to longer employment durations.
45more likely to use UI and on average also spend more time in UI when they use UI.
In the model with ex ante homogeneous agents we use the data for the incidence and duration
by year of birth. For the ’young’ phase we take the data from the cohorts born 1970-1985 and
two thirds of the cohorts born 1960-1969, for the ’middle age’ phase we take the average from
one third of the cohorts born 1960-1969, the cohorts born 1950-1959 and one third of the cohort
born 1940-1949. For the ’old age’ phase we take the average from two thirds of the cohorts born
1940-1949 and the cohorts born 1925-1939. We shift part of the cohorts to get three more or less
comparable groups in terms of cohorts covered. The group of ’employed’ in each lifecycle phase
of the model is simply equal to the share of individuals that did not use UI.
Next, we construct, with some abuse of terminology, a group of ’short-’ and ’long-term’
unemployed. We divide the group of UI users per period in individuals that use UI less than 2
years, the ’short-term unemployed’, and individuals that use more than 2 years, the ’long-term
unemployed’. Per age group we know the average share of time spent in UI, but not for
individuals that use more or less than 2 years separately. From the Ministry of Social Affairs we
have data on the number of individuals in a certain duration class in UI for the period
2001-2006. These data suggest that the average unemployment duration of individuals
unemployed for less than 1 year for 20-34, 35-49 and 50-64 year olds is in the order of
respectively, 4, 5 and 6 months of UI. However, this is only for one spell. We calibrate the data
for a lifecycle period of 14 years. To get reasonable durations for ’short-’ and ’long-term’
unemployed over a 14 year period we use 12, 15 and 18 months of UI for young, middle aged
and old aged ’short-term’ unemployed individuals, respectively. The duration of ’long-term’
unemployed is then calculated so as to let the weighted average per age group accord with the
data of De Koning et al. (2006). The resulting probabilities of becoming ’employed’, ’short-term
unemployed’ and ’long-term unemployed’ (ρ) and the shares of time spent unemployed per age
group are given in Table 6.2.35 The value for γ, a technology parameter that determines the
elasticity of UI use with respect to the UI beneﬁt level, is set to 30 which gives a beneﬁt
elasticity of .6, in line with the empirical literature.36
35 We use the search technology parameter αd per lifecycle phase to calibrate the unemployment duration of ’employed’,
’short-term unemployed’ and ’long-term unemployed’ in each lifecycle phase.
36 We set this value somewhat above .5, which seems a focal point in the empirical literature, as most micro-econometric
studies do not take into account the effect of higher UI premiums on the use of UI.
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49The resulting ’UI rates’ increase with age: 2.18. 2.57 and 3.14 for the young, middle aged and
old aged respectively, with an average of 2.63. The tax rate t2 that balances the budget is 1.94.37
Figures 6.2-6.4 give respectively the income, consumption and assets lifecycle patterns for a
selection of lifecycles. In particular we consider the proﬁles of individuals that are: i) employed
in all working phases of the lifecycle (EEE), ii) long-term unemployed in the young phase and
employed thereafter (LEE), iii) employed in the ﬁrst two lifecycle phases and long-term
unemployed in old age (EEL), and iv) long-term unemployed in all working lifecycle phases
(LLL). We discuss some patterns of particular interest.
From Figure 6.2, we can see that young employed immediately start with an income equal to
the wage (for the young), the long-term unemployed ﬁrst only receive beneﬁts and then join the
employed and receive the wage (for the young). Income then remains constant up to the age of
34 when they take a search technology draw again at the start of the middle age phase. Note that
the income streams for the young are the same for the lifecycle phases EEE and EEL (and also
for LEE and LLL) as the outcomes for the middle and old age phase are still probabilistic when
young. Also note that the income proﬁles in old age for EEL and LLL almost lie on top of each
other. Indeed, the additional wealth that the EEL individuals take into old age relative to the LLL
individuals (see below) hardly affects their search effort in old age and hence their
unemployment duration and income pattern in old age.
Figure 6.3 shows the consumption patterns. Differences are stark between the young
employed and unemployed, a direct result of the assumption that young unemployed can not
borrow against future wages and hence can only consume their unemployment beneﬁt. We see
that consumption jumps up in middle age for individuals that are lucky enough to draw
’employed’ in middle age. Then individuals move into old age, relative to middle age the
differences between the individuals that draw ’employed’ and those that draw ’long-term
unemployed’ in terms of consumption are bigger. This is due to two effects. First, long-term
unemployment is longer for old age workers than for middle age workers (in line with the data).
Second, there are less remaining periods to smooth the income shock. However, note that the
drop in consumption due to the longer unemployment spell in old age is less dramatic than the
’drop’ in consumption due to the liquidity constraint for the young unemployed. Note also that
consumption is the same in old age and retirement, as there is no uncertainty left after the search
technology at the start of old age is drawn.
Finally, comparing Figure 6.3 with Figure 6.2 we see that during working phases all
37 Van Kuringen (2005) presents data on macro expenditures on UI and the costs of running the system. The employer
pays 1.75% of the gross wage plus 2.45% over gross daily wages between 58 and 167 euros. The employee pays 5.85%
over gross daily wages between 58 and 167 euros. In total some 5.5 billion euro in 2005, with compensation for
employees at 211 billion euro (CPB, 2007) this is about 2.6% of labour costs (for the private sector, the public sector runs
its own UI scheme). This is higher than in our model. Indeed, in our abstract model individuals are either unemployed and
receiving UI or employed, hence we ignore nonparticipation other than UI, this leads us to overstate share of the number
of employed periods relative to the number of unemployed periods.
50individuals consume less then their wages, to save for retirement. Figure 6.4 shows this in terms
of assets. Assets remain at zero for young unemployed, but as soon as individuals ﬁnd a job they
start accumulating assets. When they enter middle age the income shock from unemployment is
never that big that individuals run into trouble again by hitting the liquidity constraint. So, as
noted above, at least for the case with ex ante homogeneous agents we might as well assume that
they are also potentially liquidity constrained but the fact that this constraint is never binding in
any lifecycle path makes it irrelevant. However, in real life at least part of these assets are in e.g.
illiquid pension or housing wealth, and unemployed middle aged or old aged workers may still
face binding liquidity constraints even though they have positive wealth. Also note that with
perfect foresight about lifetime length and without a bequest motive individuals build down their
assets to zero at the end of the lifecycle.
Figures 6.5-6.7 give respectively the income, consumption and assets lifecycle patterns for
the same lifecycles, but now in the absence of liquidity constraints. We brieﬂy discuss some
important differences with the ﬁgures above from the model with liquidity constraints. The
income patterns are the same, by construction, because we change the technology parameters αd
to keep unemployment durations in the various lifecycle phases in line with the data.
The differences start to appear in the lifecycle proﬁles for consumption. Without liquidity
constraints for the unemployed, beneﬁts only determine part of consumption in unemployment
for the young. Indeed, the difference in consumption between the employed and the unemployed
is much smaller. Compared to lifetime income, the income shock from the unemployment period
when young is not that big. Also note that individuals that draw the long-term unemployed
search technology in all three lifecycle phases end up with lower consumption in old age than in
the case with liquidity constraints. This is because they will have consumed more assets when
they were young and long-term unemployed, being able to borrow from future income.
The asset proﬁles show that the young unemployed now initially can run up a debt,
consuming more than their beneﬁts, with the long-term unemployed still ending up with a debt
when they enter the middle age phase of the lifecycle. Further note that individuals that draw the
’long-term unemployed’ search technology when young start borrowing, additional consumption
when young and unemployed is more important than in retirement, but when they draw
’long-term unemployed’ again in middle age they start saving, the need for additional
consumption in retirement starts to dominate the need for additional consumption when
unemployed.
6.1.2 Simulation: varying the replacement rate
First we study the impact of changes in the replacement rate, and see if optimal outcomes are in
the vicinity of actual levels. Furthermore, we can also check some elasticities in the calibrated
model, like the use of UI with respect to the beneﬁt level and the consumption of unemployed
with respect to the beneﬁt level.
51In our base simulation we assume that young unemployed are fully credit constrained. Table 6.3
gives the outcomes for a selection of variables in the base simulation for different levels of the
replacement rate. For the base setup a replacement rate in the order of .6-.7 is optimal (the
second-best optimum). At this replacement rate the marginal insurance gains from moving units
of consumption of the employed to the unemployed equal the marginal moral hazard losses due
to reduced search effort. The ﬁrst row gives the difference in expected lifetime utility expressed
in units of consumption.38 Low replacement rates are not optimal because the marginal
insurance gain is higher than the marginal loss due to moral hazard. High replacement rates are
not optimal because then the marginal insurance gain is smaller than the marginal loss due to
moral hazard. Furthermore, close to the optimum, welfare losses from sub optimal replacement
rates are small. Further away they rise, up to 1.6% at a replacement rate of .1.
Table 6.3 also shows that a 10 percent increase in the replacement rate (from .7 to .77)
increases the use of beneﬁts by 6.1% (from 2.63 to 2.79), in line with the ﬁndings of empirical
research. The tax rate rises faster than the unemployment rate, due to the interaction effect of
higher beneﬁts and a higher number of recipients. The model also gives us a consumption
elasticity of beneﬁts for the unemployed (not shown in the table). In the base simulation,
consumption of the unemployed rises by 2.8% when we increase beneﬁts by 10%. In the case
where we assume no liquidity constraints for the unemployed (see below), consumption rises by
.7% when we increase beneﬁts by 10%. The empirical studies in Section 4 suggest a value for
the consumption elasticity of beneﬁts in this range.39
In the last row of Table 6.3 we also give outcomes in the absence of moral hazard, as an
indication of the relative size of moral hazard.40 Speciﬁcally, this row shows the difference in
utility (in consumption units) between the outcome without moral hazard for different
replacement rates and the second best optimum with moral hazard at the replacement rate of
.6-.7. To get rid of the moral hazard we give the unemployed access to the same level of
consumption in unemployment, but the net transfer of unemployment beneﬁts and UI premiums
(once employed) to the unemployed is kept constant during the lifecycle phase. Hence, any
savings on unemployment beneﬁts due to higher search effort and any additional UI premiums
go to the unemployed, effectively removing the search distortion. In this case we see that
compared to the case with moral hazard, utility is either virtually unchanged (for low beneﬁt
levels, where the extent of moral hazard is limited anyway) or rises (for higher beneﬁts levels).
At a replacement rate of .6 the cost of moral hazard is .1 percent of per period consumption, and
38 In particular, let V0
0 be expected utility at the optimal replacement rate andV0
1 be expected utility at some other
replacement rate. The ﬁrst row then shows ((V0
1 /V0
0 )1/(1−θ) −1)∗100%.
39 The drop in consumption upon entering unemployment also seems in line with empirical studies. In the presence of
liquidity constraints, consumption drops on average by 10.4% upon entering unemployment. Without liquidity constraints,
consumption drops on average by 3.6% upon entering unemployment. Gruber (1997) reports an average drop of 6.8% in
consumption upon entering unemployment.
40 And the insurance gains from UI, at the optimum the marginal loss in moral hazard equals the marginal insurance gain.
52Table 6.3 Varying the replacement rates of UI, base simulation
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .77 .8 .9
Utility difference in consumption units (in %)a − 1.6 − 0.4 − 0.1 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.5
’UI rate’ (in %) 1.81 2.01 2.30 2.45 2.63 2.79 2.87 3.30
Tax rate (in %) .20 .66 1.22 1.56 1.94 2.25 2.40 3.09
Utility diff. in cons. units, no moral hazard (in %)a − 1.6 − 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
a Utility difference relative to the second best UI system, expressed in consumption units.
Table 6.4 Varying the replacement rates of UI, risk aversion +100%
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Utility difference in consumption units (in %)a − 23.2 − 2.4 − 0.5 − 0.2 0.0 0.0 − 0.3
’UI rate’ (in %) 1.79 1.93 2.27 2.45 2.63 2.86 3.24
Tax rate (in %) .20 .64 1.22 1.56 1.94 2.39 3.03
a Utility difference relative to the second best UI system, expressed in consumption units.
Table 6.5 Varying the replacement rates of UI, ’moral hazard’ +50%
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Utility difference in consumption units (in %)a − 1.3 − 0.2 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.3 − 0.8
’UI rate’ (in %) 1.61 1.78 2.13 2.36 2.63 2.99 3.66
Tax rate (in %) .18 .59 1.15 1.51 1.94 2.50 3.41
a Utility difference relative to the second best UI system, expressed in consumption units.
Table 6.6 Varying the replacement rates of UI, no liquidity constraints
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Utility difference in consumption units (in %)a − 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.3 − 0.7
’UI rate’ (in %) 1.98 2.13 2.33 2.46 2.63 2.88 3.36
Tax rate (in %) .21 .68 1.23 1.56 1.94 2.42 3.15
a Utility difference relative to the second best UI system, expressed in consumption units.
53Table 6.7 Varying the replacement rates of UI, ﬂows in and out of unemployment +100%
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Utility difference in consumption units (in %)a − 1.4 − 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 − 0.2 − 0.5
’UI rate’ (in %) 1.82 2.03 2.31 2.45 2.63 2.87 3.32
Tax rate (in %) .20 .66 1.23 1.56 1.94 2.41 3.12
a Utility difference relative to the second best UI system, expressed in consumption units.
at .7 it is .2. At a replacement rate of .9 removing moral hazard changes the difference in utility
with the second-best optimum from -.5 to +.2. We can actually reach the ﬁrst-best level, by
giving unemployed a lump sum transfer equivalent to net wages for the duration of the
unemployed period.41 The ﬁrst-best leads to a rise in utility measured in consumption units by .3
percent when compared to the second-best UI with a replacement rate of .6 to .7. Hence,
(expected) utility in the second-best optimum is not that far from utility in the ﬁrst-best.
Table 6.4 considers the optimal replacement rate when we increase the coefﬁcient of relative
risk aversion θ from 2 to 4. With more risk averse agents the optimal replacement rate rises to
the range .7 to .8, the range of current UI beneﬁt levels, due to higher insurance gains from UI.42
Table 6.5 shows the optimal replacement rate when we increase the elasticity of UI use with
respect to UI beneﬁts from .6 to .9, a larger value seems outside the empirically plausible range,
by reducing γ from 30 to 20.43 With more ’moral hazard’ the optimal replacement drops, to the
range .5 to .6.
Table 6.6. gives the optimal replacement rate when there are no credit constraints for
unemployed youngsters. When there are no credit constraints, unemployed youngsters can
smooth the income shock from unemployment over the rest of their life, reducing marginal
utility from additional income in unemployment. As a result, the gains from insurance fall.
Indeed, the optimal replacement rate drops to the range .3 to .6.44
Finally, Table 6.7 considers whether a more dynamic labour market results in a different
optimal replacement rate. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the probability to become ’short-term
unemployed’ or ’long-term unemployed’ doubles but that the duration of unemployment in these
41 This is also true when there are credit constraints. In our calibration all employed workers consume less than their
income, and hence the inability to borrow from future income is no longer binding when income is the same in
employment and unemployment.
42 In this simulation, we change γ (from 30 to 36) and the different αdy,αdm and αdo for the different outcomes of the
search technology draw to keep ceteris at paribus. That is, we keep the elasticity of unemployment with respect to
beneﬁts (evaluated at b/w = .7) and unemployment durations constant in the calibration.
43 And again changing the αd’s to keep the elasticity of unemployment with respect to beneﬁts and unemployment
durations unchanged.
44 Again changing the αd’s and γ to keep the elasticity of unemployment with respect to beneﬁts and unemployment
durations unchanged. Note that this simulation is not the same as when we abolish credit constraints, for we keep the
beneﬁt elasticity and unemployment durations the same in the calibration.
54states is cut in half.45 The optimal replacement rate is in the same range as in the base
simulation, though departures from the optimum seem to be a bit less costly. Hence, we do not
ﬁnd that workers in more dynamic labour market need less insurance. However, if the shortening
of the unemployment durations would reduce the importance of liquidity constraints, we
probably would ﬁnd a bigger effect of the dynamics on the optimal replacement rate, so this
result seems to be rather model speciﬁc.
6.1.3 Simulation: introducing UISA
In the base model above we then introduce individual accounts for unemployment. We keep the
replacement rate ﬁxed and consider what happens when we introduce mandatory savings into a
UISA. The main goal here is to show what happens to the labour market and try to understand
the welfare effects under different assumptions. To determine whether a UISA can actually
improve welfare we have to go a step further by comparing a UISA with the second-best UI
system, which we do below.
Table 6.8 gives the results for mandatory savings rates ranging from 0%, the initial UI
system, to 10% (for expositional purposes). Let us ﬁrst consider the effect on unemployment and
taxes. The higher the saving rate the more people will end up with a positive terminal account.
This implies that for more people the distortion from the beneﬁts and the mandatory savings
disappears. In the model this dominates the worse incentives due to a higher effective tax rate for
individuals that end up with a negative terminal account. Time in UI falls, for example by 14
percent for a mandatory savings rate of 4 percent. With less individuals in unemployment and
more contributions to the individual accounts the negative account balances shrink, leading to a
substantial drop in the tax rate, by more than 50 percent in the case of a mandatory savings rate
of 4%.
Turning to welfare, we see that for a mandatory savings rate of 4% welfare increases. This is
the gain in expected utility, ex post individuals that end up with a negative terminal balance still
lose relative to the UI system. However there are a number of competing explanations for this
welfare gain, the UISA may provide more efﬁcient liquidity insurance but may also simply
reduce the level of insurance, and the optimal UI on a ﬁner grid is somewhat below .7. Below we
disentangle these potential gains. Table 6.8 also shows that for a sufﬁciently high mandatory
savings rate welfare will start to fall, indeed the result is an inefﬁciently large drop in risk
pooling among individuals.
Finally, we also report the shares of individuals that end up with different balances. Without
behavioural changes, De Koning et al. (2006, Box 3.2, p.37) compute that 57% never use UI
over the lifecycle, 16 percent uses UI at some point but ends up with a positive terminal balance,
45 Due to e.g. a reduction in employment protection. That employment protection reduces labour market ﬂows is a robust
ﬁnding whereas the net effect on the level of unemployment seems relatively minor, see e.g. Deelen et al. (2006).
55Table 6.8 Introduction of UISA in the existing UI system, base simulation
Mandatory savings rate 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Change in utility, in consumption unitsa 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 − 0.1
Unemployment rate (in %) 2.63 2.47 2.26 2.23 2.16 2.15
Tax rate (in %) 1.94 1.20 .84 .58 .43 .32
Never unemployed (in %) 58 58 58 58 58 58
Unemployed but with pos. terminal account (in %) . 14 27 30 35 35
Unemployed with neg. term. account < 50% of beneﬁts (in %) . 13 8 6 5 6
Unemployed with neg. term. account > 50% of beneﬁts (in %) . 15 7 6 2 1
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
Table 6.9 Introduction of UISA in the existing UI system, risk aversion +100%
Mandatory savings rate 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Change in utility, in consumption unitsa 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.2 − 0.3 − 0.4
Unemployment rate (in %) 2.63 2.52 2.36 2.32 2.26 2.25
Tax rate (in %) 1.94 1.20 .84 .58 .43 .32
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
Table 6.10 Introduction of UISA in the existing UI system, ’moral hazard’ +50%
Mandatory savings rate 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Change in utility, in consumption unitsa 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Unemployment rate (in %) 2.63 2.39 2.08 2.04 1.92 1.91
Tax rate (in %) 1.94 1.19 .83 .57 .42 .31
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
Table 6.11 Introduction of UISA in the existing UI system, no credit constraint
Mandatory savings rate 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Change in utility, in consumption unitsa 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Unemployment rate (in %) 2.63 2.41 2.18 2.14 2.04 2.04
Tax rate (in %) 1.94 1.19 .83 .57 .42 .31
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
56Table 6.12 Introduction of UISA in the existing UI system, ﬂows in and out of unemployment +100%
Mandatory savings rate 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Change in utility, in consumption unitsa 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Unemployment rate (in %) 2.63 2.32 2.20 2.18 2.11 2.09
Tax rate (in %) 1.94 .89 .45 .20 .05 .01
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
10 percent ends up with a negative balance of less than 50 percent of beneﬁts used and 17
percent ends up with a negative balance of more than 50 percent of beneﬁts used. The simulation
that comes closest to their mandatory savings rate (1.4-1.9 percent) is 2.0%. We get numbers
that are very close: 58, 14, 13 en 15 percent respectively. This does not come as a surprise since
we calibrated our incidence and durations on their data. However, to arrive at this distribution it
was necessary to distinguish between ’short-’ and ’long-term’ unemployed in our simulation
model, and this distribution seems adequate to capture a realistic distribution of terminal
balances. Table 6.8 further shows that even for a mandatory savings rate of 10 percent, 7 percent
of the individuals still ends up with a negative terminal balance.
Table 6.9 shows what happens when we increase risk aversion. In this case a UISA does not
improve welfare. The optimal replacement rate in the UI system is above .7 in this case (see
above), and the UISA works in the wrong direction by effectively reducing it. Indeed, beyond
2% welfare already begins to fall. This is another illustration of the remark before that it is
important to choose the optimal combination of mandatory savings and beneﬁt levels. The
results on unemployment, tax rates and the distribution of terminal balances (not in tables
6.9-6.12) are not qualitatively affected.
Table 6.10 shows how the results for the UISA change when we increase the ’moral hazard’
in UI. The optimal UI replacement rate is then lower, and higher mandatory savings achieve this,
up to a mandatory savings rate of 8% welfare increases. Table 6.11 illustrates a similar effect,
without credit constraints the optimal replacement rate is lower and the UISA reduce the sub
optimal high level of risk pooling. Finally, again the results are basically the same for the more
dynamic labour market, Table 6.12, though the range of mandatory savings rates that generate a
welfare improvement is not somewhat wider. Furthermore, unemployment drops more than in
the more ’polarised’ labour market in the base simulation.
6.1.4 Simulation: the optimal mix of mandatory savings and replacement rates
Above we already noted that comparing a UISA with a sub optimal UI system makes it hard to
determine where the gains from a UISA are coming from. Here we consider a grid of
combinations of mandatory savings rates and replacement rates to see whether a UISA can
improve welfare starting from an optimised UI system.
Table 6.13 gives the welfare effects of different combinations of mandatory savings rates
57Table 6.13 Welfare effects combinations of mandatory savings and repl. rates, base simulationa
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − 11.77 − 11.78 − 11.78 − 11.78 − 11.78 − 11.78 − 11.78 − 11.78
.10 − 1.63 − 1.68 − 1.73 − 1.73 − 1.74 − 1.74 − 1.74 − 1.74
.20 − .75 − .79 − .84 − .89 − .93 − .95 − .95 − .95
.30 − .39 − .42 − .46 − .50 − .54 − .64 − .65 − .66
.40 − .17 − .18 − .21 − .25 − .28 − .36 − .45 − .47
.50 − .04 − .04 − .04 − .07 − .11 − .16 − .24 − .34
.60 .02 .03 .04 .03 .01 − .03 − .10 − .17
.70 .00 − .02 .03 .06 .07 .02 .00 − .06
.80 − .12 − .14 − .03 .04 .01 .03 .04 − .01
.90 − .46 − .50 − .55 − .31 − .38 − .29 NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
Table 6.14 Welfare effects combinations of mandatory savings and repl. rates, no credit constraintsa
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − .19 − .20 − .20 − .20 − .20 − .20 − .20 − .20
.10 − .10 − .15 − .20 − .20 − .20 − .20 − .20 − .20
.20 − .01 − .05 − .10 − .14 − .19 − .20 − .20 − .20
.30 .05 .03 − .01 − .05 − .09 − .19 − .20 − .20
.40 .09 .09 .06 .02 − .01 − .09 − .18 − .19
.50 .10 .11 .11 .08 .04 − .01 − .09 − .18
.60 .08 .11 .12 .12 .09 .05 − .01 − .09
.70 .00 − .02 .05 .11 .11 .06 .04 − .02
.80 − .16 − .18 − .05 − .08 .04 .03 − .02 .01
.90 − .56 − .60 − .66 − .38 − .45 − .34 NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
Table 6.15 Welfare effects combinations of mandatory savings and repl. rates, risk aversion +100%a
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − 99.30 − 99.30 − 99.30 − 99.30 − 99.30 − 99.30 − 99.30 − 99.30
.10 − 54.63 − 54.71 − 54.80 − 54.81 − 54.81 − 54.81 − 54.81 − 54.81
.20 − 16.78 − 17.01 − 17.26 − 17.52 − 17.81 − 17.89 − 17.90 − 17.90
.30 − 6.89 − 7.13 − 7.39 − 7.66 − 7.96 − 8.63 − 8.73 − 8.80
.40 − 3.39 − 3.57 − 3.79 − 4.05 − 4.30 − 4.88 − 5.59 − 5.73
.50 − 1.46 − 1.60 − 1.72 − 1.94 − 2.19 − 2.66 − 3.24 − 3.97
.60 − .43 − .49 − .58 − .72 − .91 − 1.31 − 1.77 − 2.37
.70 .00 − .10 − .10 − .12 − .20 − .56 − .87 − 1.33
.80 − .07 − .15 .02 .14 .07 − .16 − .36 − .72
.90 − .85 − .95 − 1.10 − .59 − .82 − .51 NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
58Table 6.16 Welfare effects combinations of mandatory savings and repl. rates, moral hazard +50%a
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − 7.97 − 7.98 − 7.98 − 7.98 − 7.98 − 7.98 − 7.98 − 7.98
.10 − 1.19 − 1.24 − 1.28 − 1.29 − 1.29 − 1.29 − 1.29 − 1.29
.20 − .44 − .48 − .52 − .56 − .60 − .61 − .61 − .61
.30 − .14 − .16 − .20 − .24 − .28 − .36 − .37 − .37
.40 .01 .01 − .02 − .06 − .08 − .16 − .23 − .24
.50 .07 .08 .10 .06 .03 − .01 − .09 − .19
.60 .08 .11 .15 .14 .11 .09 .03 − .05
.70 .00 − .02 .05 .14 .15 .10 .10 .04
.80 − .21 − .23 − .26 − .10 .02 .07 .02 .07
.90 − .74 − .80 − .87 − .96 − .58 − .42 NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
Table 6.17 Welfare effects combinations of mandatory savings and repl. rates, ﬂows +100%a
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − 1.92 − 1.92 − 1.92 − 1.92 − 1.92 − 1.92 − 1.92 − 1.92
.10 − 1.37 − 1.41 − 1.41 − 1.41 − 1.41 − 1.41 − 1.41 − 1.41
.20 − .59 − .61 − .64 − .65 − .65 − .65 − .65 − .65
.30 − .27 − .29 − .32 − .34 − .35 − .35 − .35 − .35
.40 − .09 − .09 − .11 − .14 − .16 − .17 − .17 − .17
.50 .01 .03 .02 .00 − .03 − .06 − .06 − .06
.60 .04 .08 .09 .09 .07 .01 .01 .01
.70 .00 .04 .11 .10 .11 .06 .05 .04
.80 − .13 − .04 .01 .07 .10 .09 .02 .07
.90 − .49 − .51 − .31 − .09 − .09 .02 NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
(columns) and replacement rates (rows), relative to the UI system with zero mandatory savings
and a replacement rate of .7, in terms of changes in consumption units. In the ﬁrst column we
see that when we look at the second digit, an UI system with a replacement rate of 60 percent is
actually superior to the UI system with a replacement rate of 70 percent. Then we see that for all
replacement rates below 60 percent in Table 6.13 welfare falls with the introduction of
mandatory savings. The insurance is insufﬁcient to start with and this becomes worse with the
introduction of individual accounts. However, starting from the optimal UI system with a
replacement rate of 60 percent we see that mandatory savings up to 3% can (slightly) improve
welfare. Giving some individuals support only through liquidity reduces the distortionary effect
of UI beneﬁts leading to an overall welfare gain. However, we can do even better, the biggest
welfare gain, .07 percent in terms of consumption relative to the initial UI scheme (.05 percent
relative to the optimal UI scheme), comes from a combination of a replacement rate of .7 and a
mandatory savings rate of 4 percent. This is because the UISA scheme can target the insurance
to individuals that suffer long unemployment spells. Note that the gain is still relatively small
59though, <.1% in consumption terms. Note also that for all replacement rates there is a point
where more mandatory savings are no longer optimal. This suggests that liquidity alone is not
optimal, some (targeted) insurance is always optimal.46 Finally, note that as a policy maker you
need quite precise knowledge on the extent of e.g. moral hazard and risk aversion. For example,
picking the right savings rate of 4% in Table 6.13 but picking the wrong replacement rate, say .6
or .8 instead of .7 already leads to an inferior outcome compared to the second-best UI system
with a replacement rate of .6. Given our limited knowledge of moral hazard and risk aversion, a
mistake is easy to make, making it less likely that welfare will rise.
The next question is whether some welfare gains remain when we assume that there are no
liquidity constraints? Table 6.14 gives the results when there are no liquidity constraints.
Perhaps the ﬁrst thing to notice is that even for low replacement rates the welfare effects are now
relatively small. Indeed, without liquidity constraints even long unemployment spells are not
that big a deal as employment spells are much longer still.
Now that we have more precision we can see that 50 percent is actually the optimal
replacement rate without credit constraints. What is interesting is that starting from this optimal
replacement rate some mandatory savings of 1-2 percent can still improve welfare, and a
combination of 60 percent and 2-3 percent of mandatory savings does even better. Since we
assume there are no liquidity constraints this can not come from more efﬁcient liquidity
insurance. So, where does this welfare gain come from? The answer is that a UISA implicitly
differentiates in the replacement rate for individuals that face short unemployment spells and
those that face long unemployment spells over the lifecycle, i.e. those that become unemployed
when they are young and those that become unemployed when they are old. The UI system is
only optimised under the restriction that the replacement rate is the same for all lifecycle phases
(and the same for short- and long-term unemployed). To study this issue we did a grid search to
look for the optimal combination of replacement rates for individuals in the young, middle age
and old age phase. The optimal replacement rates for these three groups when there are no credit
constraints turns out to be 10, 25 en 70 percent respectively.47 The trade-off between insurance
and moral hazard shifts in favour of insurance for older workers. Most individuals that are only
unemployed when they are young still end up with a positive terminal balance, those that are
unemployed when they are old typically end up with a negative terminal balance. In this way the
UISA gives more insurance to older workers. When we start from the optimal replacement rates
for the different lifecycle phases, mandatory savings no longer raise welfare in the simulations.
46 Also note that for very high replacement rates and mandatory savings rates the model does not solve anymore. This
happens because some individuals would like to exert negative search effort. For a high mandatory savings rate still some
long-term unemployed end up with a negative terminal account, making income in employment lower than income in
unemployment, hence zero search effort is optimal. We do not ’ﬁx’ the numerical problems in these simulations by setting
the search effort of these groups to zero because these mandatory savings rate and replacement rate combinations are
not that interesting anyway.
47 In the case of credit constraints for young unemployed their optimal replacement rate rises to 65%.
60Hence, again this welfare gain can be achieved by optimising the UI system.
Table 6.15 shows that when risk aversion is higher the optimal combination is less mandatory
saving, 3 percent relative to 4 percent in the base case, and more insurance, a replacement rate of
80 percent compared to 70 percent in the base case.
Table 6.16 shows that with 50% more moral hazard the optimal combination does not really
change. But now there is another optimum which has a bit less insurance, 60 percent. Table 6.17
shows that higher ﬂows basically result in the same optimal combination for savings and
insurance in our setup, again suggesting that making the labour market more dynamic does not
necessarily leads to a stronger case for UISA.
6.2 Ex ante heterogeneous agents
Next we consider optimal UI, the introduction of a UISA and the optimal combination of
mandatory savings and replacement rates in a setup where individuals are ex ante heterogeneous
(next to having different lifecycle outcomes for employment and unemployment ex post).
Speciﬁcally, we divide the working population in three education groups: low, medium and high
educated.
6.2.1 Calibration
In each lifecycle phase, the education groups differ in their wages, and the incidence and
duration of UI use. The parameters and some values in the calibration are given in Table 6.18.
The groups are by construction of equal size, in line with the grouping of De Koning et al.
(2006) so as to ﬁt the model to their incidence and duration data by education. The incidence
data per lifecycle phase and by education are taken directly from De Koning et al. (2006), see
Table 6.1. We use the same methodology as in the homogeneous case to construct the UI
durations of short- and long-term unemployed per lifecycle phase, i.e. assume durations for
short-term unemployed based on information of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
and then calculate the average duration in long-term unemployment so that the average UI
duration per lifecycle phase and education matches the data from De Koning et al. (2006). For
simplicity (and a lack of information) we assume that the duration of short-term unemployment
is the same for the three education groups. The resulting outcomes for incidence in Table 6.19
reﬂect the inputs from Table 6.1 discussed above. The low educated are more likely to enter UI
than the high educated, and also have a longer average duration in UI.
We take the wage proﬁles from Ter Rele (2007), see Figure 6.1. Speciﬁcally, for the low
educated we use the average wage of those individuals with only elementary and those with the
lowest level of secondary education. For the high educated we take individuals with higher
vocational training or a university degree. The rest is medium educated. The resulting average
wages per education for the three different lifecycle phases are given in Table 6.18. In particular
61Table 6.18 Parameter values and calibration outcomes, ex ante heterogeneity
Parameter values
UI incidence ρ ’Employed’ ’Short-term unemployed’ ’Long-term unemployed’
Low educated
- young .78 .18 .04
- middle age .81 .10 .09
- old age .90 .01 .09
Medium educated
- young .76 .21 .03
- middle age .80 .14 .06
- old age .89 .05 .06
High educated
- young .83 .15 .02
- middle age .85 .12 .03
- old age .92 .05 .03
Low educated Medium educated High educated
Wages
- young 1.26 1.41 1.71
- middle age 1.43 1.81 2.48
- old age 1.56 2.02 3.11
Replacement rate b/w .7
Risk aversion θ 2.
’Search elasticity’ γ 30.
Time units per phase N 168.
Calibration outcomes
UI duration (in months) ’Employed’ ’Short-term unemployed’ ’Long-term unemployed’
Low educated
- young 0. 12 71
- middle age 0. 15 50
- old age 0. 18 77
Medium educated
- young 0. 12 42
- middle age 0. 15 37
- old age 0. 18 74
High educated
- young 0. 12 22
- middle age 0. 15 27
- old age 0. 18 71
UI rate (in %) Low educated Medium educated High educated
All lifecycle phases 3.45 2.47 1.41
- young 2.96 2.25 1.32
- middle age 3.63 2.57 1.55
- old age 4.28 3.19 1.82
Overall UI rate (in %) 2.62
Tax rate t2 1.78
62in the later stage of life wages between low and high educated start to diverge.48
Table 6.18 also gives some aggregate variables. The UI rate falls with education, with the
low educated being more than twice as often unemployed as the high educated. Furthermore, the
tax rate t2 that balances the budget of 1.78 in the heterogeneous agents case is lower than the
1.94 in the homogeneous case. The reason for this is that low educated are more likely to use UI
than high educated and they get lower beneﬁts49, as a result total expenditures on UI and hence
taxes required to ﬁnance these expenditures are lower than in the homogeneous agents case.
6.2.2 Simulation: varying the replacement rate
As before, we ﬁrst consider the optimal replacement rate in a tax ﬁnanced UI system, to check
the elasticities and to see whether plausible optimal replacement rates come out. For the
heterogeneous case we only consider the base simulation and the case of no liquidity constraints.
The results for the base simulation, with credit constraints for unemployed during the young
phase, are given in Table 6.19. For the low educated a replacement rate in the order of .7 to .8 is
optimal.50 For the medium educated the optimal replacement rate is in the order of .6 to .7 and
for the high educated it is in the order of .3 to .5. Hence, also the high educated prefer a positive
replacement rate, despite the redistribution in the system, in part due to the credit constraint
when they are young and unemployed and no have no way to access their future high wages.
In the second set of rows we consider the welfare effects relative to the starting point, a
replacement rate of .7. To compare the welfare results across agents and overall we now present
compensating variations in terms of euro per month.51 As an overall welfare measure we look at
the sum of compensating variations and see which replacement rate generates the highest level of
welfare.52 This turns out to be in the range of .5 to .7, somewhat broader than the range of .6 to .7
in the homogeneous case (and the welfare cost at .5 is also relatively minor). A somewhat higher
replacement rate of .8 or .9 generates a welfare loss in terms of monthly consumption of about 2
respectively 6 euro. For a much lower replacement rate like .1 there is a much larger welfare loss
of 17 euro per month. At this replacement rate the liquidity constraint really starts to bite.
Table 6.20 gives the results for the case without liquidity constraints. The ﬁrst thing to
notice, again, is that the welfare effects are much smaller, unemployment beneﬁts are not the
48 This suggests that young high educated individuals want to bring more income from the future to the present than
young low educated, potentially making a credit constraint in unemployment more problematic for them (for a given
incidence and duration of unemployment).
49 The replacement rate is the same, but the wages of the low educated are lower.
50 Under the constraint that all education groups have a uniform replacement rate and tax rate.




1−θ/(1−θ)ds ⇒ c0 = ((1−θ)V0/(4N))1/(1−θ) and then report c1 −c0 where
c1 = ((1−θ)V1/(4N))1/(1−θ).
52 As noted in e.g. Varian (1992) compensating variation is a limited welfare measure since we assign equal value to the
utility of all agents. Furthermore, the welfare gain is only in expectation, due to the ex post heterogeneity in labour market
outcomes it is not a Pareto improvement where all agents win in all possible lifecycle paths.
63Table 6.19 Varying the replacement rates of UI, ex ante heterogeneity, base simulation
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Compensating variation relative to optimum per type (in % of consumption at the optimum)
Low educated − 3.4 − 1.1 − .3 − .1 .0 .0 − .2
Medium educated − 1.4 − .4 − .1 .0 .0 − .1 − .4
High educated − .1 .0 .0 − .1 − .2 − .5 − .9
Compensating variation in consumption per month in euro relative to replacement rate of .7
Low educated − 35 − 11 − 3 − 1 0 0 − 2
Medium educated − 18 − 5 − 1 0 0 − 1 − 5
High educated 2 4 4 2 0 − 4 − 11
Total CV/3 − 17 − 4 0 0 0 − 2 − 6
UI use and tax rate (in %)
’UI rate’ low educated 2.80 3.02 3.30 3.45 3.62 3.85 4.23
’UI rate’ medium educated 1.74 1.97 2.30 2.47 2.67 2.94 3.43
’UI rate’ high educated .88 1.05 1.29 1.41 1.57 1.77 2.13
’UI rate’ overall 1.81 2.01 2.30 2.44 2.62 2.85 3.26
Tax rate .18 .59 1.12 1.43 1.78 2.22 2.85
Table 6.20 Varying the replacement rates of UI, ex ante heterogeneity, no credit constraint
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Compensating variation relative to optimum per type (in % of consumption at the optimum)
Low educated − 1.0 − .6 − .2 − .1 .0 .0 − .3
Medium educated − .2 − .1 .0 .0 − .1 − .2 − .5
High educated .0 − .1 − .3 − .4 − .6 − .9 − 1.3
Compensating variation in consumption per month in euro relative to replacement rate of .7
Low educated − 11 − 6 − 2 − 1 0 0 − 3
Medium educated − 2 0 1 1 0 − 2 − 6
High educated 11 9 6 3 0 − 5 − 13
Total CV/3 − 1 1 1 1 0 − 2 − 7
UI use and tax rate (in %)
’UI rate’ low educated 2.99 3.14 3.35 3.48 3.65 3.89 4.35
’UI rate’ medium educated 1.94 2.11 2.34 2.49 2.68 2.96 3.50
’UI rate’ high educated 1.02 1.15 1.32 1.43 1.57 1.78 2.18
’UI rate’ overall 1.98 2.14 2.33 2.46 2.63 2.88 3.34
Tax rate 0.19 0.62 1.13 1.43 1.79 2.24 2.93
64sole determinant of consumption for unemployed youngsters. The lower educated still have an
optimal replacement rate in the order of .7 to .8, though lower replacement rates are now less
costly. The medium educated now have a lower optimal replacement rate of about .5 to .6, and
the high educated prefer the low .1 in this case. Indeed, the liquidity insurance disappears when
there are no liquidity constraints and the high educated then prefer only little lifetime income
insurance, given the limited insurance gains for them and the distribution to the lower educated
in the system. Overall, .7 is no longer in the optimal replacement rate range, which now drops to
.3 to .6, the same range as for the homogeneous agents case. The welfare loss from a
replacement rate of .7 is still limited though, on average 1 euro per month per person for a period
of (4x14=) 56 years compared to the optimum of .3 to .6.
6.2.3 Simulation: introducing UISA
Next we consider the effects on introducing mandatory savings accounts for the heterogeneous
agents case, keeping the replacement rate at .7. The results for the base simulation are given in
Table 6.21, and for the case without liquidity constraints in Table 6.22.
Table 6.21 shows that the low educated only lose from the mandatory savings, for them this
is simply less insurance. The medium educated also do not gain from mandatory savings, and for
savings rates beyond 2 percent actually lose. The higher educated prefer more mandatory
savings, which implies less redistribution to low and medium educated. Overall, for the three
groups in total there is a small welfare gain of 1 euro per month. Also in the heterogeneous case
the net incentives are positive for all education groups leading to a fall in unemployment. Table
6.21 also gives the distribution of account balances for the total and by education group. The
pattern for the total is the same as for the homogenous case, with more people having more
positive balances the higher we set the mandatory savings rate. Furthermore, unsurprisingly the
lower educated are more likely to end up with a negative balance than the medium and in
particular the high educated. For a mandatory savings rate of 4% respectively 21, 15 and 7
percent of the low, medium and high educated end up with a negative terminal balance.
Table 6.22 shows what changes when there are no liquidity constraints. The loss for the low
educated from mandatory savings is virtually the same, but the loss for the medium educated is
lower and the gain for the high educated is higher, they now prefer a lower replacement rate.
With the high educated being more ’over insured’ at a replacement rate of .7 a mandatory
savings rate of 4% now generates an overall welfare gain of 2 euro per month.
6.2.4 Simulation: the optimal mix of mandatory savings and replacement rates
Finally, also in the heterogeneous case we consider the optimal combination of mandatory
savings and replacement rates per education type and overall.53
53 But still under the restriction that the replacement and tax rates are the same across education types.
65Table 6.21 Introduction of UISA, ex ante heterogeneity, base simulation
Mandatory savings rate 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Compensating variation in euro per month relative to an UI with rr=.7
Low educated 0 0 − 1 − 4 − 7 − 9
Medium educated 0 − 1 − 1 − 2 − 2 − 2
High educated 0 2 5 8 9 10
Total CV/3 0 0 1 1 0 − 1
UI use and tax rate (in %)
’UI rate’ low educated 3.62 3.44 3.31 3.31 3.32 3.22
’UI rate’ medium educated 2.67 2.48 2.24 2.15 2.12 2.11
’UI rate’ high educated 1.57 1.45 1.23 1.15 1.15 1.15
’UI rate’ overall 2.62 2.46 2.26 2.21 2.20 2.16
Tax rate 1.78 1.06 .74 .54 .39 .28
Terminal account balances
Total
Never unemployed (in %) .59 .59 .59 .59 .59 .59
Unemployed but with positive terminal account (in %) . .13 .27 .30 .31 .34
Unemployed with negative account < 50% of used beneﬁts (in %) . .14 .04 .04 .08 .07
Unemployed with negative account > 50% of used beneﬁts (in %) . .14 .10 .07 .02 .00
Low educated
Never unemployed (in %) .57 .57 .57 .57 .57 .57
Unemployed but with positive terminal account (in %) . .13 .22 .23 .23 .30
Unemployed with negative account < 50% of used beneﬁts (in %) . .09 .00 .11 .18 .11
Unemployed with negative account > 50% of used beneﬁts (in %) . .21 .21 .10 .03 .02
Medium educated
Never unemployed (in %) .54 .54 .54 .54 .54 .54
Unemployed but with positive terminal account (in %) . .15 .31 .38 .40 .40
Unemployed with negative account < 50% of used beneﬁts (in %) . .16 .08 .02 .05 .06
Unemployed with negative account > 50% of used beneﬁts (in %) . .15 .07 .06 .01 .00
High educated
Never unemployed (in %) .65 .65 .65 .65 .65 .65
Unemployed but with positive terminal account (in %) . .12 .28 .32 .32 .32
Unemployed with negative account < 50% of used beneﬁts (in %) . .16 .04 .00 .02 .03
Unemployed with negative account > 50% of used beneﬁts (in %) . .07 .03 .03 .01 .00
66Table 6.22 Introduction of UISA in the existing UI system, ex ante heterogeneity, no credit constraint
Mandatory savings rate 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Compensating variation in euro per month relative to UI with rr=.7
Low educated 0 0 − 1 − 4 − 7 − 9
Medium educated 0 − 1 0 − 1 − 1 − 2
High educated 0 3 6 9 10 10
Total CV/3 0 1 2 1 1 0
UI use and tax rate (in %)
’UI rate’ low educated 3.65 3.43 3.27 3.27 3.28 3.16
’UI rate’ medium educated 2.68 2.43 2.15 2.04 2.00 2.00
’UI rate’ high educated 1.57 1.38 1.09 1.03 1.03 1.03
’UI rate’ overall 2.63 2.41 2.17 2.12 2.10 2.06
Tax rate 1.79 1.06 .74 .54 .39 .28
Table 6.23 gives the base simulation with credit constraints for the low educated. Now that we
also can vary the replacement rate we ﬁnd that at least some mandatory savings can improve
their welfare, when combined with a somewhat higher replacement rate of .8 (at a mandatory
savings rate of 3%), though the gain is only 70 euro cents per month. Table 6.24 shows that
medium educated actually prefer no mandatory savings. Table 6.25 shows that the high educated
typically prefer mandatory savings, less redistribution. What is interesting is that their optimal
combination is a replacement rate of .7 and a mandatory savings rate of 10 percent (or more).
This illustrates they value liquidity when they run the risk of liquidity constraints, but apart from
that they would like to have as little lifetime income insurance in the system as possible. Table
6.26 shows that across education groups we ﬁnd an optimal mandatory savings rate of 4% and a
replacement rate of .7, similar to the homogeneous agents case. The overall gain is only 1 euro
per worker per month though.
Tables 6.27-6.30 give the optimal combinations in the absence of liquidity constraints. The
optimal choice of low educated is hardly affected, they now prefer 4% mandatory savings and a
replacement rate of .8. The medium educated still prefer no mandatory savings, but now prefer a
lower replacement rate of .5. The high educated now no longer require liquidity, and as a result
they now only go for a low replacement rate and high mandatory savings, to minimize the
redistribution in the system. Overall welfare is now maximized at a lower replacement rate of .6,
and also a lower mandatory savings rate of 2%.54
54 The welfare gain is higher than in the case with liquidity constraints, but this is because we compare welfare relative to
zero mandatory savings and a replacement rate of .7. The extent of ’over insurance’ is than higher to begin with than in
the case with liquidity constraints.
67Table 6.23 Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings/replacement rates, low educated, base simulationa
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − 221.39 − 221.57 − 221.57 − 221.57 − 221.57 − 221.57 − 221.57 − 221.57
.10 − 34.79 − 36.19 − 37.13 − 37.32 − 37.39 − 37.41 − 37.41 − 37.41
.20 − 18.23 − 19.25 − 2.96 − 22.05 − 22.88 − 23.26 − 23.41 − 23.42
.30 − 11.05 − 11.78 − 13.15 − 14.85 − 16.02 − 17.76 − 18.14 − 18.51
.40 − 6.45 − 6.95 − 7.99 − 9.42 − 11.13 − 13.33 − 15.02 − 15.39
.50 − 3.31 − 3.75 − 4.29 − 5.48 − 6.94 − 9.84 − 11.81 − 13.43
.60 − 1.20 − 1.70 − 1.72 − 2.52 − 3.73 − 6.80 − 9.16 − 1.96
.70 .00 − .46 − .38 − .51 − 1.33 − 3.90 − 7.20 − 8.96
.80 .09 − .38 − .68 .68 .02 − 1.86 − 4.72 − 7.19
.90 − 2.02 − 2.77 − 3.70 − 4.51 − 2.32 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
Table 6.24 Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings/replacement rates, med. educated, base sim.a
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − 106.18 − 106.31 − 106.31 − 106.31 − 106.31 − 106.31 − 106.31 − 106.31
.10 − 17.71 − 18.43 − 19.00 − 19.04 − 19.04 − 19.02 − 19.02 − 19.02
.20 − 9.15 − 9.98 − 1.51 − 11.05 − 11.55 − 11.65 − 11.62 − 11.62
.30 − 5.26 − 6.01 − 6.77 − 7.08 − 7.53 − 8.58 − 8.72 − 8.72
.40 − 2.58 − 3.25 − 3.85 − 4.52 − 4.74 − 5.65 − 6.67 − 6.77
.50 − .87 − 1.52 − 1.83 − 2.50 − 2.99 − 3.44 − 4.45 − 5.41
.60 .00 − .53 − .77 − 1.06 − 1.74 − 2.17 − 2.72 − 3.75
.70 .00 − .92 − .84 − .84 − .82 − 1.57 − 1.76 − 2.43
.80 − 1.11 − 2.07 − 1.66 − .84 − 1.13 − 1.76 − 1.86 − 1.98
.90 − 4.76 − 6.10 − 7.65 − 9.06 − 6.20 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
Table 6.25 Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings/replacement rates, high educated, base simulationa
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − 3.53 − 3.53 − 3.53 − 3.53 − 3.53 − 3.53 − 3.53 − 3.53
.10 2.17 2.64 2.50 2.55 2.55 2.55 2.55 2.55
.20 3.78 4.21 4.82 4.82 4.63 4.73 4.78 4.78
.30 4.25 4.82 5.58 6.15 6.29 6.06 6.10 6.20
.40 4.40 5.25 5.91 6.82 7.39 7.72 7.44 7.48
.50 3.83 4.68 5.63 6.67 7.58 8.58 8.72 8.48
.60 2.41 3.64 4.87 5.82 6.96 8.53 9.24 9.34
.70 .00 .61 2.31 4.21 5.35 7.72 9.01 9.53
.80 − 3.81 − 3.34 − .90 1.84 2.64 5.58 7.58 8.67
.90 − 11.20 − 11.20 − 11.53 − 8.68 − 6.39 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
68Table 6.26 Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings/replacement rates, total/3, base simulationa
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − 11.37 − 11.47 − 11.47 − 11.47 − 11.47 − 11.47 − 11.47 − 11.47
.10 − 16.77 − 17.33 − 17.87 − 17.94 − 17.96 − 17.96 − 17.96 − 17.96
.20 − 7.87 − 8.34 − 8.88 − 9.43 − 9.93 − 1.06 − 1.08 − 1.09
.30 − 4.02 − 4.32 − 4.78 − 5.26 − 5.75 − 6.76 − 6.92 − 7.01
.40 − 1.54 − 1.65 − 1.98 − 2.38 − 2.83 − 3.75 − 4.75 − 4.89
.50 − .12 − .19 − .17 − .44 − .78 − 1.57 − 2.51 − 3.45
.60 .40 .47 .79 .75 .50 − .14 − .88 − 1.79
.70 .00 − .25 .36 .95 1.07 .75 .02 − .62
.80 − 1.61 − 1.93 − 1.08 .56 .51 .65 .33 − .16
.90 − 5.99 − 6.69 − 7.63 − 7.42 − 4.97 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
Table 6.27 Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings/replacement rates, low educ., no credit constrainta
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − 13.28 − 13.59 − 13.59 − 13.59 − 13.59 − 13.59 − 13.59 − 13.59
.10 − 1.69 − 12.22 − 13.27 − 13.48 − 13.57 − 13.59 − 13.59 − 13.59
.20 − 8.08 − 9.16 − 1.92 − 12.10 − 12.97 − 13.39 − 13.56 − 13.57
.30 − 5.76 − 6.48 − 7.90 − 9.67 − 1.91 − 12.70 − 13.10 − 13.47
.40 − 3.73 − 4.17 − 5.25 − 6.73 − 8.47 − 1.74 − 12.43 − 12.82
.50 − 2.05 − 2.36 − 2.94 − 4.17 − 5.64 − 8.58 − 1.58 − 12.19
.60 − .76 − 1.17 − 1.06 − 1.94 − 3.18 − 6.29 − 8.61 − 1.41
.70 − .00 − .44 − .21 − .16 − 1.12 − 3.71 − 7.03 − 8.72
.80 − .14 − .57 − .84 − .17 .09 − 1.73 − 4.54 − 6.93
.90 − 2.61 − 3.26 − 4.01 − 4.65 − 2.66 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
Table 6.28 Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings/replacement rates, med. educ., no cred. constr.a
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − 3.49 − 3.63 − 3.63 − 3.63 − 3.63 − 3.63 − 3.63 − 3.63
.10 − 2.27 − 3.03 − 3.59 − 3.63 − 3.63 − 3.63 − 3.63 − 3.63
.20 − 1.11 − 1.95 − 2.51 − 3.03 − 3.54 − 3.66 − 3.63 − 3.63
.30 − .22 − .89 − 1.71 − 2.02 − 2.48 − 3.51 − 3.66 − 3.63
.40 .41 − .12 − .72 − 1.40 − 1.64 − 2.53 − 3.51 − 3.61
.50 .72 .22 .00 − .68 − 1.16 − 1.59 − 2.60 − 3.54
.60 .65 .29 .19 − .05 − .75 − 1.11 − 1.66 − 2.70
.70 − .00 − .92 − .55 − .19 − .31 − 1.01 − 1.18 − 1.83
.80 − 1.64 − 2.55 − 1.78 − 2.24 − 1.16 − 1.52 − 1.37 − 1.52
.90 − 6.03 − 7.25 − 8.61 − 9.82 − 6.94 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
69Table 6.29 Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings/replacement rates, high educ., no credit constrainta
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 11.11 11.16 11.16 11.16 11.16 11.16 11.16 11.16
.10 1.68 11.21 11.11 11.16 11.16 11.16 11.16 11.16
.20 9.92 1.54 11.16 11.21 11.07 11.11 11.16 11.16
.30 8.82 9.59 1.45 11.02 11.21 1.97 11.07 11.11
.40 7.44 8.54 9.25 1.25 1.83 11.16 1.88 1.97
.50 5.59 6.78 8.01 9.01 9.92 1.88 11.02 1.83
.60 3.22 4.73 6.35 7.25 8.49 1.02 1.73 1.83
.70 .00 .61 2.74 5.02 6.30 8.63 9.92 1.45
.80 − 4.66 − 4.10 − 1.13 1.75 2.93 6.30 8.16 9.35
.90 − 13.31 − 13.17 − 13.26 − 9.53 − 7.94 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
Table 6.30 Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings/replacement rates, total/3, no credit constrainta
Savings/replacement rate 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 8% 10%
.01 − 1.89 − 2.02 − 2.02 − 2.02 − 2.02 − 2.02 − 2.02 − 2.02
.10 − .76 − 1.35 − 1.91 − 1.98 − 2.02 − 2.02 − 2.02 − 2.02
.20 .24 − .19 − .75 − 1.31 − 1.82 − 1.98 − 2.01 − 2.02
.30 .95 .74 .28 − .22 − .73 − 1.75 − 1.90 − 2.00
.40 1.37 1.42 1.09 .71 .24 − .70 − 1.69 − 1.82
.50 1.42 1.54 1.69 1.39 1.04 .23 − .72 − 1.63
.60 1.04 1.29 1.83 1.75 1.52 .87 .15 − .76
.70 .00 − .25 .66 1.56 1.62 1.30 .57 − .04
.80 − 2.15 − 2.41 − 1.25 − .22 .62 1.02 .75 .30
.90 − 7.32 − 7.89 − 8.63 − 8.00 − 5.85 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units.
6.3 Summarizing the simulation results
The model suggests that in the presence of credit constraints for young unemployed the optimal
replacement rate is in the range of .6 to .7 in our preferred setup, .8 with more risk aversion, and
closer to .5 with more moral hazard or in the absence of liquidity constraints. Low educated
prefer a higher replacement rate and high educated prefer a lower replacement rate, much lower
in the absence of liquidity constraints in unemployment.
Introducing some mandatory savings in the order of 4% into an UI system with a
replacement rate of .7 leads to a small gain in welfare of about 1 euro per month in welfare in
our preferred setup and with liquidity constraints. More risk aversion makes mandatory savings
no longer welfare improving, but more moral hazard strengthens the case for mandatory savings,
as does the absence of liquidity constraints. The latter may seem counterintuitive, but that is
because a replacement rate of .7 is too high in the case without liquidity constraints, and
mandatory savings effectively reduce the replacement rate.
70The question then is whether mandatory savings can still improve welfare when we start from
the second-best UI system with the optimal replacement rate. When the unemployed are
liquidity constrained, a small welfare gain is indeed possible, but the gain is only .05% in
consumption terms. Furthermore, to realize this welfare gain you have to pick the right
combination of the mandatory savings rate and the replacement rate, a sub optimal choice
quickly leads to no welfare gain at all or even a loss. Given our limited knowledge of the extent
of moral hazard and risk aversion it is easy to make a mistake.
Surprisingly, a UISA can also improve welfare slightly starting from the second-best UI
system in the absence of liquidity constraints, by .02% in consumption terms. In this case,
clearly the beneﬁt can not come from more efﬁcient liquidity insurance. A system with
mandatory savings implicitly differentiates the replacement rate between individuals that suffer
few unemployment periods, they get little or nothing, and those that suffer many periods of
unemployment, they keep their current insurance. By doing so, a UISA may still slightly
improve welfare in the absence of liquidity constraints. However, when we differentiate the
replacement rate in the UI system between different groups of workers the welfare gains from
mandatory savings in the absence of liquidity constraints indeed disappears.
As for the effects by education, the low educated prefer no mandatory savings (more
redistribution) and the high educated prefer more mandatory savings (less redistribution). When
there are liquidity constraints the high educated prefer a generous replacement rate (high
liquidity) with high mandatory savings (low redistribution). When there are no liquidity
constraints, the high educated prefer both a low replacement rate and high mandatory savings
(no need for liquidity and low redistribution). Also in the case of heterogeneous agents, overall
welfare may rise when we introduce mandatory savings, due to the implicit differentiation in the
replacement rate. But again, the same can be achieved in the UI system.
71727 Limitations of the analysis
Any model is an abstract representation of the real world where one tries to capture the main
mechanisms relevant for a certain research question. Below we consider some limitations of the
analysis above and consider how these might affect the outcomes.
For simplicity we have set the subjective discount rate, interest rate and productivity growth
rate to zero. With a subjective discount rate higher than the interest rate individuals would like to
borrow more from the future, this would increase the demand for liquidity, making liquidity
constraints more problematic. Similarly, productivity growth would increase wage proﬁles, part
of which individuals want to consume earlier in working life, again making liquidity constraints
more problematic.
Another simpliﬁcation is that we assume there is a liquidity constraint at zero assets when
unemployed. We could assume a constraint at some negative number or a higher interest rate on
borrowing than on saving as in e.g. Imrohoroglu (1989), both would result in more borrowing by
the young unemployed reducing the need for government provided liquidity or insurance. We
also assume the unemployed person has no access to other income from e.g. a working spouse or
relatives, again overstating the need for liquidity or insurance. The liquidity constraint we
consider above should therefore be viewed as an extreme case for the young unemployed. On
the other hand, we may understate the relevance of liquidity constraints for elderly unemployed,
because we assume they have full access to their accumulated (pension) assets. But on average,
we seem to get the role of liquidity constraints about right, as the average consumption response
to a change in beneﬁts is in line with empirical studies.55 A drawback of the model is that the
liquidity constraint is exogenously imposed.56 Ideally we would derive the liquidity constraint
from some sort of optimising behaviour by creditors. Indeed, with an optimally set endogenous
liquidity constraint the government can perhaps not improve welfare by giving young
unemployed loans.
Another simpliﬁcation is that we abstract from an endogenous retirement choice. Some
people fear that individual accounts will lead to more early retirement. However, this is not clear
from the outset. To the extent that individual accounts lead to higher asset holdings close to
retirement it is important to realize that this is only an income effect, and income effects on the
work-leisure choice are typically assumed to be small. Well, at least for individuals that do not
55 We further do not consider liquidity constraints for employed workers. When e.g. young employed also face liquidity
constraints we face a trade-off between reducing a liquidity constraint for unemployed via a premium or a loan and
increasing a liquidity constraint for employed workers due to the premium or mandatory savings. One solution to this
problem is integrating the unemployment risk with the longevity risk, as suggested by e.g. Stiglitz and Yun (2005). Also,
’oversaving’ can be mitigated by setting a ceiling on the account beyond which the contributions are no longer mandatory.
56 Actually, the liquidity constraint is not consistent with the rest of the model, as all individuals are working most of the
time in the remainder of their working life. The same holds for Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004) and Stiglitz and Yun
(2005) by the way.
73face credit constraints, which is more likely to be the case for the individuals that end up with a
positive terminal balance. In contrast, the UI entitlement has a substitution effect, which directly
affects the relative price of work and leisure, making individuals more eager to ’retire early’ via
UI and not look for a job again. Hence, it seems dubious that a UISA will lead to more early
retirement than UI.57
Perhaps a more severe limitation is that we do not consider the case of myopic individuals.
When individuals are ’nearsighted’ (as in the case of hyperbolic time preferences, see e.g.
Laibson, 1997) they may perceive the mandatory savings (at least in part) as a tax and the UI
loan (at least in part) as a subsidy. When the mandatory savings and the tax to bail out
individuals with a negative terminal balance are higher than the UI premium, which is the case
when we maintain the same replacement rate, this will reduce the incentives to ﬁnd and keep a
job. However, this potential problem actually becomes less of a problem when we think that the
individuals that are myopic are also the ones that end up with a negative terminal balance. For
them the mandatory savings are de facto a tax.
We further assume that individuals are either working or in UI. In real life there are many
more states. This presumably leads to a tax rate for UI on employment that is too low, but this
can easily be ﬁxed by adjusting the employment/unemployment ratio in the lifecycle phases.
More interesting seems to be the correlation between UI and other types of labour market risks,
like sickness and disability. Stiglitz and Yun (2005) and Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004) suggest
that individuals accounts can provide more efﬁcient intra personal insurance when these risks are
not perfectly correlated. Next to more states it would also be interesting to study individual
accounts with more periods. In particular, the interaction of the optimal replacement rate proﬁle
and a UISA can not be meaningfully studied in our setup where individuals know immediately
how long they will be unemployed once they draw the search technology.
Let us conclude by noting that we also use a simple UI setup in the model above. In real life,
after UI there is often welfare and an integrated analysis seems to be called for. However, we
doubt whether individual accounts for the basic tax ﬁnanced income level is a realistic scenario.
Also, there are lower and upper limits on UI contributions and beneﬁts which affect the
redistribution and insurance in the system. Indeed, our analysis above suggests that high
educated individuals might currently be ’over insured’ which is mitigated by the upper limit on
UI contributions and beneﬁts. We further found that the optimal replacement rate for older
unemployed workers is higher than for younger unemployed workers, and given the longer UI
entitlement for individuals with more tenure this also seems to be ’captured’ in the current
system.
57 In any case, if one believes that individual accounts do lead to more early retirement we can mitigate this problem by
integrating the mandatory savings for unemployment with those for pensions (individuals can consume part of their
pension for certain contingencies, in this case unemployment), or by setting a ceiling on the maximum account balance
and/or the mandatory savings rate.
74Clearly, this list of potentially relevant limitations is not exhausting, one can also think of e.g.
wage bargaining, endogenous education and transition issues for older workers etc.
75768 Concluding remarks
The analysis above suggests that the welfare gains from individual accounts for the
unemployment risk in the Netherlands are small. Indeed, the welfare gain is only .05% in
consumption terms relative to the second-best UI system. The main advantage UISA have over
premium ﬁnanced UI is the ability to distinguish between the need for just liquidity and lifetime
income insurance. However, liquidity constraints seem to play a minor role in most
unemployment spells, unemployment beneﬁts mainly act as lifetime income insurance.58
Furthermore, to reap a welfare gain the policy maker needs to have precise knowledge on the
extent of moral hazard and risk aversion of the workers. A sub optimal choice easily results in a
welfare loss, and a mistake is easy to make given our limited knowledge of moral hazard and
risk aversion. All in all, UISA then do not seem to offer much over the current UI system in the
Netherlands. However, this does not mean that individual accounts are not interesting for other
types of income ’shocks’, like education expenditures and subsidies for early retirement, which
have a larger intra personal and a smaller interpersonal component than unemployment
beneﬁts.59
The analysis above also gives insight in the optimal level of the replacement rate of UI. The
current level of UI (75% in the ﬁrst two months of unemployment, and 70% thereafter) comes
close to the optimum in the calibrated model, provided that the unemployed in the Netherlands
are quite risk averse and sometimes run into liquidity constraints. When risk aversion is smaller
and liquidity constraints do not play a role in unemployment, the optimal replacement rate is
lower. But then again, close to the optimum the costs of a deviation are typically small, in the
order of .1% in consumption terms when we miss the optimal replacement rate by 10 percentage
points. The analysis further shows that the optimal beneﬁt level varies with age and education, in
line with the current system that links the maximum UI duration with the preceding employment
duration and the minimum and maximum income borders for UI premiums and beneﬁts.
58 Also, for the individuals that are the most likely to run into liquidity constraints, the long-term unemployed, incentives
typically do not change under the UISA system, because they end up with a negative terminal account. Furthermore,
even for those unemployed for which liquidity constraints are relevant and that do not end up with a negative terminal
balance, converting beneﬁts into a loan still has a smaller effect on job search behaviour than reducing beneﬁts.
59 See e.g. Orszag and Snower (1997) and Sorensen et al. (2006).
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8384Appendix 1 First-, second- and ’third’-best in a simpler
model
In this appendix we consider ﬁrst-best UI, second-best UI and ’third-best’ UISA in a simpliﬁed
setup of the model in Section 5, with only one lifecycle phase (instead of four) and only two
search technology outcomes (instead of three).
First-best
With (exogenous) probability ρ individuals are ’employed’ and with probability 1−ρ they are
’unemployed’. That is, the ’unemployed’ are initially unemployed and then become employed
for the remainder of the lifecycle phase, where the duration of unemployment is endogenous.
The ’employed’ are employed for the whole lifecycle phase, and for simplicity we assume they
do not have to search (in the main text we assume they are at a corner). Expected lifetime utility
V0 is
V0 = ρVe +(1−ρ)Vu (A.1)








u(cu(x))dx − f(s) (A.3)
where ce(.) and cu(.) are the respective consumption streams and f(s) is a function that converts
search units into effective search effort (with f 0(s) > 0 and f 00(s) > 0). The lifecycle phase lasts
N periods. We further have the resource constraint
Z N
0
u(ce(x))+u(cu(x))dx ≤ (ρN+(1−ρ)g(s)N)w (A.4)
where g(s) is the duration of the lifecycle phase that the ’unemployed’ are employed (with
g0(s) > 0). During the initial unemployment periods, the ’unemployed’ produce nothing (e.g. no
household production or additional leisure).
Maximizing (A.1) with respect to ce(.), cu(.) and s, taking (A.4) into account gives the
ﬁrst-best solution for consumption and search effort
cu(x) = ce(x) = c (A.5)
f 0(s) = g0(s)Nwu0(c) (A.6)
consumption is equalized across states and search effort is set so that the marginal cost of search
equals the marginal gain (the additional consumption units g0(s)Nw times the marginal utility
gain from higher consumption).
85Second-best
Next we characterize the second-best UI system, where the social planner can control
consumption via the beneﬁt level, but does not control search effort, which is chosen by the
unemployed. We ﬁrst consider the case without credit constraints, and subsequently the case
with credit constraints.
Without credit constraint
Individuals now choose their own consumption and search effort. When employed, individuals
now pay a tax t to ﬁnance beneﬁts b for the unemployment periods. The indirect utility function
of the employed is
Ve = u(w −t)N. (A.7)
The indirect utility function of the unemployed is
Vu = u((1−g(s))b+g(s)(w −t))N− f(s), (A.8)
where
f 0(s) = g0(s)N(w −t −b)u0(cu), (A.9)
with cu the consumption chosen by the unemployed. Taxes and beneﬁts drive a wedge between
the socially and privately optimal search effort. Even though consumption in unemployment will
be lower than in the ﬁrst-best case, and hence the marginal utility of additional consumption will
be higher, the search effort will typically be inefﬁciently low compared to the ﬁrst-best.
What is the best the social planner can do? Taking into account the budget constraint
(ρN+(1−ρ)g(s)N)t = (1−ρ)(1−g(s))Nb, (A.10)
and noting that by the envelope theorem the direct effect of b and t onVU is 0 (s is chosen
optimally by the ’unemployed’), maximizing (A.1) with respect to b we arrive, after some









(1+η(b)) = u0(cu) (A.11)














That is, at the optimal beneﬁt level the marginal utility of consumption in employment, the
weighted average on the left hand side (of the employed periods of the ’employed’ and the
86employed periods of the ’unemployed’), times one plus the elasticity of the ratio of
unemployment to employment with respect to the beneﬁt level has to equal the marginal utility
of consumption in unemployment. A special case arises when η is zero, no moral hazard, in this
case we have full insurance. But typically η > 0, so to maintain equality in the condition above
the marginal utility of consumption in unemployment has to be higher than in employment, i.e.
consumption in unemployment has to be lower than in employment.
With credit constraint
Now suppose that the unemployed face a credit constraint, so that they can not borrow from
future wage income. How does this affect the optimal beneﬁt level? The indirect utility function
of the unemployed is now given by
Vu = (1−g(s))Nu(b)+g(s)Nu(w −t)− f(s), (A.13)
where optimal private search effort is now
f 0(s) = g0(s)N((w −t −b)u0(w −t)+u(w −t)−u(b)+u0(w −t)(w −t −b), (A.14)
the unemployed will search harder than in the absence of the credit constraint, as more search
now not only leads to more lifetime income, but also to a smoother consumption pattern.
Again maximizing (A.1) taking into account the budget constraint and using the envelope
theorem we now arrive at the following simpler expression for optimal b
u0(w −t)(1+η(b)) = u0(b), (A.15)
because consumption by the ’employed’ and by the ’unemployed’ once employed will be the
same. How does this compare to the case without credit constraint? Without the credit constraint
the ’unemployed’ will consume cu > b while unemployed. Now he or she can only consume b.
As a result the marginal utility on the righthandside will be higher, the insurance gain of
unemployment beneﬁts rises. This means that η can be higher as well, we will also have more
moral hazard at the optimum. Typically this implies that the optimal beneﬁt level will be higher
with than without credit constraints for the unemployed.
’Third-best’
Finally, we may consider how a simple UISA system gives the social planner an additional tool
to raise welfare. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the unemployed receive a loan p per period next to
their beneﬁt b, which needs to be repaid during the subsequent employment period (all
redistribution runs via b). The indirect utility function of the unemployed is now given by








87Maximizing (A.1) with respect to p gives








so the loan is used to equalize consumption over the unemployment and employment periods of









(1+η(b,p)) = u0(cu) (A.18)
so the optimal beneﬁt level is set as if there were no credit constraint.60
60 Provided that p > 0 is optimal. Indeed, it may actually not be optimal to remove the liquidity constraint in the presence
of other distortions, as noted by e.g. Stiglitz and Yun (2005, p. 2042, footnote 14), because the welfare loss from reduced
search effort may dominate the gain in consumption smoothing.
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